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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently the media has spotlighted the marketing efforts of 
pharmaceutical companies that target physicians in an attempt to 
influence, directly or indirectly, the choices these physicians make about 
which medications to recommend and prescribe.  Articles have been 
published with such headlines as Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They 
Pitch, Is Your Doctor Tied to Drug Makers?, and The Danger in Drug 
Kickbacks.1  The implication of these reports is that these marketing 
efforts are influencing and in some instances compromising medical 
judgment. 
Marketing drugs to physicians is nothing new.  Pharmaceutical 
companies have been systematically pushing their products to doctors 
since at least the early 1950s.2  Concerns regarding the impact of this 
marketing on physician behavior have been expressed by patients, 
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 1. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2006, at A1; Editorial, Is Your Doctor Tied to Drug Makers?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2007, at A18; 
Editorial, The Danger in Drug Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2007, at A18. 
 2. Jeremy A. Greene, Pharmaceutical Marketing Research and the Prescribing Physician, 
146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 743 (2007) (“Data products relevant to prescriber profiling are 
collected and sold by private health care information organizations; these data products have been a 
central plank of pharmaceutical marketing for the past 50 years . . . .”).  An early example of 
pharmaceutical marketing was associated with The Great Moments in Medicine and Great Moments 
in Pharmacy, which were “a series of commercial paintings produced by Parke, Davis & Company 
[(now a subsidiary of Pfizer)] between 1948 and 1964.  Beginning in the early 1950s, Parke-Davis 
delivered reproductions of the Great Moments images to physicians and pharmacies throughout the 
United States and Canada.”  Jonathan M. Metzl & Joel D. Howell, Making History: Lessons from the 
Great Moments Series of Pharmaceutical Advertisements, 79 ACAD. MED. 1027, 1027 (2004); Pfizer 
Inc., 2000: Pfizer Joins Forces with Warner-Lambert, http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/ 
pfizer_warner_lambert.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
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professional organizations, commentators, legislators, and physicians 
themselves, and can be traced back several decades.  These concerns 
have never really abated, but as pharmaceutical companies have become 
economic giants and health care costs have risen wildly, renewed media 
attention to the topic has brought the issue to the forefront of the debate 
on patient care and health care quality. 
This Article begins by detailing the current state of pharmaceutical 
marketing,3 focusing on both the level of expenditures and the various 
marketing techniques used.  It then discusses the positive and negative 
effects of this marketing.  Ultimately, although noting that regulations 
and guidelines try to help curb the negative aspects of marketing, the 
Article concludes that these efforts are largely unsuccessful in preventing 
pharmaceutical marketing’s undue and unhealthy influence on physicians 
and the broader health care system. 
This Article then argues that the most effective way to curtail the 
potentially deleterious effects of marketing is to recognize that 
physicians have a fiduciary duty to give the well-being of their patients 
the highest priority.  This fiduciary duty, this Article asserts, includes a 
subsidiary obligation to avoid pharmaceutical marketing when patients’ 
interests may be compromised.  In turn, a failure to meet this obligation 
would potentially expose physicians to a cause of action for breach of 
their fiduciary duty.  This Article will subsequently outline the specific 
structure for a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on a physician’s 
failure to avoid insidious pharmaceutical marketing practices that 
compromise his or her medical judgment.  Finally, this Article will 
address the challenges and benefits of constructing and implementing 
such a duty. 
II. MARKETING EXPENDITURE AND SCOPE 
The composite amount spent on pharmaceutical marketing in this 
country is hard to pinpoint, but available figures indicate it is around $12 
billion annually.4  Concerned about rising expenditures on marketing, 
                                                          
 3. This Article addresses only pharmaceutical marketing, which encompasses systematic 
efforts by pharmaceutical companies to induce physicians to prescribe their drugs.  Marketing should 
be distinguished from advertising, which typically refers to pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to 
target patients/consumers directly, also known as Direct to Consumer Advertising or DTCA.  There 
has also been significant marketing of medical products.  However, this Article limits itself to a 
discussion of pharmaceutical marketing. 
 4. Sheryl Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing 
the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2257 (2004) (“Annually, the 
pharmaceutical industry spends $12 billion promoting and marketing their products to physicians 
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Congress at one point considered a bill that would have eliminated tax 
incentives supporting the industry’s gifts to physicians.5  The bill listed 
findings that: “(1) drug company expenditures on marketing and 
administration are twice research and development expenditures, (2) the 
pharmaceutical industry annually spends $11,000,000,000 promoting and 
marketing their products . . . , [and] (3) drug companies annually spend 
$8,000 to $13,000 per physician on such promotions.”6  Despite 
increased spending on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising beginning in the 
mid-1980s when regulations regarding these advertisements were 
relaxed,7 expenditures on physician marketing have continued to rise.8 
The great majority of these expenditures are spent on “detailing.”  
Detailing is the term used to denote the practice of pharmaceutical 
representatives visiting the offices of physicians or otherwise contacting 
physicians to promote their company’s drugs and/or medical devices.  
Detailers provide physicians with handouts, pharmaceutical samples, 
“freebies” like textbooks and stethoscopes, and sponsorships for 
continuing medical education programs.9  As of February 2007, there 
                                                                                                                       
through gifting, travel reimbursements and meal expenses, with approximately $10,000 being spent 
on each individual physician.” (citing H.R. 2641, 107th Cong. (2001))); Stephanie Greene, False 
Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 
42 (2005) (“[T]he $2.4 billion spent on consumer advertising pales in comparison to the more than 
$8 billion spent each year on marketing to physicians.” (citing Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, 
America’s Other Drug Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 34)); Marshall B. Kapp, 
Drug Companies, Dollars, and the Shaping of American Medical Practice, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 237, 
241 (2005) (“In 2001, the American pharmaceutical industry spent $12.5 billion on marketing its 
products, equaling approximately $10,000 per licensed physician, a 50% increase since 1998.” 
(citing Scott Hensley, Doctors Are Found to Be Susceptible to Drug Pitches, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 
2002, at D6)); Tobias L. Millrood, When Drug Sales Representatives Go Too Far, Winter 2007 AM. 
ASS’N JUSTICE-CLE 521 (2007) (“By 2000, pharmaceutical companies spent $15.7 billion 
promoting their products, with the largest share (84%) directed toward medical professionals 
through commercial detailing, drug samples, and journal advertisements.” (citing M.B. Rosenthal et 
al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498 (2002))); Natasha 
Singer, No Lipitor Mug? Drug Makers Cut Out Goodies for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at 
A1 (“[In 2008], besides giving away nearly $16 billion in free drug samples to doctors, 
pharmaceutical companies spent more than $6 billion on ‘detailing’—an industry term for the sales 
activities of drug representatives including office visits to doctors, meal-time presentations and 
branded pens and other handouts.” (citing IMS Health, a health care information company)). 
 5. Save Money for Prescription Drug Research Act of 2000, H.R. 4088, 106th Cong. (2000).  
The bill died in the House and never became law.  A further discussion of state and federal 
legislative efforts to remedy the perceived problem of pharmaceutical marketing will follow in Part 
IV.C, infra notes 133–58 and accompanying text. 
 6. H.R. 4088. 
 7. See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory 
and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 147 (1997) (noting that in 1985, the FDA lifted a two-year 
moratorium on direct to the consumer advertising). 
 8. Sara Selis, Study Calculates Outlay of Pharmaceutical Research: Drug Companies 
Promote Through Multiple Channels, STAN. REP., May 21, 2003, available at http://news-service. 
stanford.edu/news/2003/may21/pharma.html. 
 9. Id.; Millrood, supra note 4. 
09.0_HAFEMEISTER FINAL 3/7/2009  12:09:56 PM 
494 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
were approximately 100,000 detailers (i.e., pharmaceutical represent-
atives) pursuing approximately 200,000 physicians who prescribe 
pharmaceuticals.10  Detailers are primarily college-educated, and 
complete training programs specifically tailored to enable them to 
promote the company’s drugs.11  It has been noted that “[a] 
pharmaceutical representative will often try to see a given physician 
every few weeks” and that “[r]epresentatives often have a call list of 
about 200 physicians with 120 targets that should be visited in four to six 
week cycles.”12  “Physicians meet with detailers as often as three to five 
times each week,”13 with an average of ten representatives a month 
visiting them.14 
Not all physicians have the same number of detailers requesting to 
meet with them, and not all physicians meet with the detailers who visit 
their office.  Using data on physicians’ prescribing habits purchased for 
nearly $20 million from the American Medical Association (AMA),15 
firms hired by pharmaceutical companies “attempt to identify [those] 
physicians most likely to prescribe a particular drug.”16  Physicians are 
“‘deciled’ into 10 groups based on their [prescription-]writing patterns,” 
which are determined by looking at a physician’s weekly total number of 
prescriptions and number of new prescriptions.17  Those in the “[h]igher 
deciles are more aggressively targeted.”18  Thus, doctors who write the 
largest numbers of prescriptions receive the greatest number of visits 
from detailers.19  “An AMA study found that physicians who [write] one 
to ten prescriptions per week [see] 2.33 detailers per week, whereas those 
                                                          
 10. Millrood, supra note 4. 
 11. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Pharmaceutical and Medicine 
Manufacturing, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs009.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 12. Millrood, supra note 4. 
 13. Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical 
“Freebies,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 210 (1991). 
 14. Greene, supra note 4, at 42 (citing CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN 
MEDICINE MEETS THE AMERICAN DREAM 120 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2003)). 
 15. See Calabro, supra note 4, at 2259–60 (noting “the AMA stands to lose more than $20 
million a year if forced to stop selling data to drug manufacturers”). 
 16. See Millrood, supra note 4 (“There are a number of firms that specialize in data and 
analytics for pharmaceutical marketing: ASI, Bayser, Campbell Alliance, CommodiCast, Cozmix, 
Dendrite, Getronics, Health Market Science (HMS), Health Products Research (HPR), iMetrikus, 
IMpactRx, IMS Health, Ingenix, LeapFrogRx, MarketRx, Medstat, Meta Pharmaceutical Services, 
LLC, Microsoft Life Sciences, NDCHealth, Premier, Questerra, SAP, Siebel Systems, Spotfire, 
Sybase, TargetRx, Tegra, Analytics, The Patient Connection, Trinity Partners, Verispan, ZDNet, and 
ZS Associates are several of the third-party outlets used.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Fisher, supra note 13, at 226–27. 
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who [write] over 150 prescriptions weekly [receive] 8 visits.”20  In 
making marketing decisions, companies may also consider the: 
(1) [p]rofitability of [the] prescription . . . ; (2) [a]ccessibility of the 
physician; (3) [t]endency of the physician to use the pharmaceutical 
company’s drugs; (4) [e]ffect of managed care formularies on the 
ability of the physician to prescribe a drug; (5) . . . adoption sequence 
of the physician (that is, how readily the physician adopts new drugs in 
place of older, established treatments); (6) . . . tendency of the 
physician to use a wide palette of drugs; and (7) [i]nfluence that 
physicians have on their colleagues.21 
Despite this aggressive targeting, physicians’ average total time 
spent with detailers is not staggeringly high; on average, physicians 
usually spend less than one minute with each pharmaceutical 
representative per visit.22  This suggests that a significant number of 
detailers are sent away without seeing physicians for anything more than 
a cursory hello.  Anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion.23 
Because of the often hasty nature of these meetings, pharmaceutical 
representatives regularly leave reminders such as “notepads, pens, rulers, 
and other useful ‘freebies’ engraved with the logo of the drug company 
and the product’s name” to enhance a new drug’s name recognition.24  
Detailers also leave drug samples with the physician.25  This “sampling” 
is frequently “considered a paradigmatic example of pharmaceutical 
promotions,” and because of the substantial expenditures involved in the 
distribution of samples to medical providers, this practice “has been 
studied extensively.”26  It has been argued that sampling allows  
 
                                                          
 20. Id. (citing H. WALKER, MARKET POWER AND PRICE LEVELS IN THE ETHICAL DRUG 
MARKET 74 (Indiana U.P. 1971)). 
 21. Millrood, supra note 4. 
 22. Greene, supra note 4, at 42. 
 23. Interview with Barbara Allison-Bryan, M.D. (Nov. 12, 2007). 
 24. Fisher, supra note 13, at 210.  Other “freebies” received by physicians include: 
golf balls with a company or drug logo, rulers, pens, pencils, note pads, mugs, glasses, 
cups, hats, caps, shirts, magnets, towels, tie tacks, clipboards, a large variety of anatomic 
models, games, puzzles, socks, visors, packages of candy, gum, popcorn, tickets to 
shows, dinners, weekend getaways, golf fees, tennis balls, and cash. 
Id. at 210 n.20 (quoting Advertising, Marketing and Promotional Practices of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. 101 (1990) 
(testimony of Dr. John C. Nelson)). 
 25. Id. at 210. 
 26. Id. at 231.  One pharmaceutical representative reported that “the sample budget for one 
product could easily exceed the total journal advertising expenditure for all products.”  William D. 
French, Perspectives, A Delicate Balance: A Perspective on Pharmaceutical Sampling, 124 
ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 588, 588 (1988). 
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“doctor[s] and patient[s] to try the product and . . . physicians to provide  
free samples to needy patients.”27 
But not all meetings between physicians and detailers are that 
hurried.  “Detailers frequently treat doctors[, including] hospital 
residents, to lunches or dinners” to discuss the company’s products.28  
Lunches supplied by drug representatives were highlighted in a very 
skeptical August 4, 2006 editorial in the New York Times: 
At a four-story medical building in New Hyde Park on Long Island, 
steaming containers of Chinese food and trays of gourmet sandwiches 
were delivered to receptive medical practices, courtesy of various drug 
companies.  Sometimes morning pastries and coffee were on the menu 
as well. 
 . . .  Merck was happy to pay $258 to provide Chinese food to the 20 
or more doctors and employees of a pulmonary practice so that its sales 
representatives could tout the virtues of an osteoporosis drug and an 
asthma treatment in a relaxed setting.  Nationwide, such lunches are 
believed to cost the pharmaceutical industry hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year, a marketing cost the companies are happy to absorb in 
hopes of bolstering sales of high-priced prescription drugs.29 
One commentator added that “companies also conduct dinner-lecture 
programs in which physicians enjoy a meal (typically in a fine 
restaurant) while listening to a . . . lecture on a medical condition that the 
sponsor’s medication is intended to treat.”30  Pharmaceutical companies 
apparently have found that their detailers are more likely to be able to get 
in a few words about their product if they come bearing food. 
Pharmaceutical companies also hire physicians to do some of their 
promotional work by joining a detailer on office visits, by giving lectures 
to groups of physicians, or by participating in clinical research studies.  
In a recent article, Dr. Daniel Carlat, a psychiatrist in Massachusetts, 
recounted his experience as a physician lecturer for Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals, the producer of Effexor XR, a drug to treat 
depression.31  In 2001, he was “flown to New York for a ‘faculty-
                                                          
 27. Fisher, supra note 13, at 231 (citing French, supra note 26, at 588).  A rebuttal to this 
assertion is considered later in this Article.  See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 28. Fisher, supra note 13, at 210. 
 29. Editorial, Please Hold the Free Lunches, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at A16. 
 30. Jeffrey T. Berger, Pharmaceutical Industry Influences on Physician Prescribing: Gifts, 
Quasi-Gifts, and Patient-Directed Gifts, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 56, 56–57 (Summer 2003). 
 31. Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, Section 6 (Magazine), at 64; see 
also Jacob Goldstein, How Drug Industry Money Affected a Psychiatrist’s Judgment, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 26, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/11/26/how-drug-industry-money-affected-a-
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development program’ [and] . . . ‘pampered in a Midtown hotel for two 
nights’” to educate him about the product.32  He was subsequently paid 
between $500 and $750 for a one-hour “Lunch and Learn” in which he 
spoke at local doctors’ offices about Effexor.33  In one year of speaking 
to doctors on behalf of Wyeth, he made approximately $30,000 in 
supplementary income.34  He recognized that he persuaded many 
physicians to prescribe Effexor, and posited that his lectures may have 
contributed to “faulty medical decision making” or led doctors “to make 
inappropriate drug choices” that may have made “their patients suffer 
needlessly” from Effexor’s poorly published, but significant withdrawal 
symptoms.35  Accounts similar to those of Dr. Carlat have been provided 
by others.36 
Pharmaceutical companies also supply large levels of funding for 
clinical research.  Nearly seventy-five percent of all funding for clinical 
trials in the United States comes from corporate sponsors.37  
“Increasingly, clinicians are invited . . . to participate in clinical trials of 
newly developed drugs, . . . often [by] enrolling their own patients as 
subjects.”38  The sponsor of the research hires physicians to conduct at 
least a portion of the clinical trial.  These doctors may have an academic 
affiliation or be clinicians associated with non-academic hospitals or in 
private practice.  “Doctors are often paid to recruit patients to [these] 
clinical trials,” usually on a per-patient basis.39  In Britain, payments 
have been up to thousands of pounds per patient who completes the 
clinical trial.40  It has been noted that a “[w]ell organised British general 
practice[] can earn an extra ₤15,000 annually for three hours’ work a 
                                                                                                                       
psychiatrists-judgment/. 
 32. Carlat, supra note 31, at 64. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 69. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Is Your Doctor Tied to Drug Makers?, supra note 1, at A18 (“[O]ne drug company invited 
doctors to a weekend training session in Orlando, Fla., to learn how to give marketing lectures to 
other doctors for an asthma medicine.  The enticement was free airfare, a rental car and hotel room, 
plus a $2,700 stipend.”). 
 37. Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?, 290 JAMA 113, 
113 (2003) (citing Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000)). 
 38. Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part I: Individual Physicians, 136 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 396, 399 (2002). 
 39. Jammi N. Rao & L.J. Sant Cassia, Ethics of Undisclosed Payments to Doctors Recruiting 
Patients in Clinical Trials, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 36, 36 (2002); Center Watch: Clinical Trials Listing 
Service, Background Information on Clinical Research, http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/ 
backgrnd.html#Section3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 40. Rao & Sant Cassia, supra note 39, at 36. 
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week.”41  In the United States, a November 2004 study published in the 
Journal of General Internal Medicine reported that thirty-seven percent 
of Maryland internists surveyed “engag[ed] in pharmaceutical-sponsored 
clinical trials and/or lectures to supplement their incomes.”42 
Pharmaceutical companies also regularly sponsor Continuing 
Medical Education (CME) programs, a certain number of which 
physicians are mandated to attend to maintain their licensure.43  The 
industry provides “a substantial proportion of the several billion dollars 
spent on CME annually,” allowing industry to influence nearly every 
aspect of the CME programming.44  This may include organizing and 
advertising the event; preparing teaching slides and curriculum materials; 
compiling lists of possible speakers, who may also be recipients of 
funding for clinical research supplied by the pharmaceutical company; 
subsidizing the attendance of practitioners, medical students, residents, 
and fellows; and providing free meals and other amenities for attendees 
at these programs.45  “At, or adjacent to, virtually all educational sessions 
subsidized by industry, [pharmaceutical] sales representatives are 
allowed to display and promote the company’s products, particularly 
[those] related to the [focus] of the program.”46  Educational materials 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 36 (citing Income Generation, MEDECONOMICS, Aug. 1996, at 44). 
 42. Bimal H. Ashar et al., Prevalence and Determinants of Physician Participation in 
Conducting Pharmaceutical-Sponsored Clinical Trials and Lectures, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
1140, 1140 (2004).  Aside from the fact that the pharmaceutical industry-sponsored clinical trials 
may influence the prescribing behavior of the physicians conducting the research, clinical trials 
sponsored by pharmaceutical companies have themselves been the target of considerable criticism.  
See Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, Conflict of Interest and the Public Trust, 284 JAMA 2237, 
2237 (2000) (“The problem lies in the conflict of interest that results from these relationships.”).  
They have been asserted to be “lower in quality [and] more likely to favor the sponsor’s product.”  
Id. at 2238 (citing Paula A. Rochon, Evaluating the Quality of Articles Published in Journal 
Supplements Compared with the Quality of Those Published in the Parent Journal, 272 JAMA 108–
13 (1994)); see also Lisa A. Bero et al., The Publication of Sponsored Symposiums in Medical 
Journals, 327 NEW ENG. J.  MED. 1135, 1135–40 (1992); Lisa A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, 
Influences on the Quality of Published Drug Studies, 12 INT’L  J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 
209, 209–37 (1996); Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug Studies Published in 
Symposium Proceedings, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 485, 485–89 (1996); David Blumenthal et 
al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science, 277 JAMA 1224, 1224–28 (1997); 
Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses of New Drugs Used in 
Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1453–57 (1999); Paula A. Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-
Supported Trials of Nonsteroidal Anti-inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 157, 157–63 (1994). 
 43. Arnold S. Relman, Separating Continuing Medical Education from Pharmaceutical 
Marketing, 285 JAMA 2009, 2009–12 (2001). 
 44. Id. at 2009; see also Kapp, supra note 4, at 247 (“CME financial sponsorship may 
substantially influence the subsequent prescribing behavior of physician attendees; in other words, 
this form of promoting its product ‘works’ for drug companies.”). 
 45. Relman, supra note 43, at 2009. 
 46. Id. 
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are prepared by the pharmaceutical company, and physicians are paid 
honoraria to lecture at CME events or other speaking engagements with 
an implicit understanding that the physician will mention the sponsoring 
company’s product.47 
And finally, pharmaceutical companies have been known to provide 
physicians “payment for attending meetings of specious advisory boards 
at which little advising by physicians, and a great deal of marketing to 
physicians, occurs.”48  “Physicians might be further enticed to attend 
[these meetings] with the promise of a gift check to be used for 
‘professional or practice-related’ activities.”49 
Pharmaceutical companies and physicians have been encouraged 
through their respective codes of practice to make these connections at 
least partially public.50  Conference speakers and authors of research 
papers are required to note any potential conflict of interest, including the 
receipt of funding from a pharmaceutical company.51  However, the 
amount and frequency of payment are not necessarily revealed.  As a 
result, the disclosures made may be limited and relatively perfunctory.52 
Rarely is there an explicit quid pro quo for this funding, but implied 
ones abound.53  When funding or “educational grants” are provided for 
lavish trips to golf and ski resorts, cocktail parties, office holiday parties, 
and travel, the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ goal is relatively obvious.  
These are rewards for writing large numbers of prescriptions.  And, for 
example, as soon as Dr. Carlat, the physician being sponsored by Wyeth, 
began to give less enthusiastic presentations about Effexor, the 
pharmaceutical company became much less enthusiastic about him.  He 
wrote: the “manager’s message couldn’t [have been] clearer: I was being 
paid to enthusiastically endorse their drug.  Once I stopped doing that, I 
was of little value to them, no matter how much ‘medical education’ I 
                                                          
 47. Fisher, supra note 13, at 211–12. 
 48. Berger, supra note 30, at 56. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 
E-8.061(3); PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PhRMA) CODE ON 
INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS, Speaker Programs and Speaker Training 
Meetings, § 7, at 9, available at http://www.phrma.org/files/PhRMA%20Marketing%20Code% 
202008.pdf. 
 51. See David M. Studdert et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Physicians’ Relationships 
with the Pharmaceutical Industry—Self-Regulation in the Shadow of Federal Prosecution, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1891, 1894 (2004). 
 52. See Relman, supra note 43, at 2010; Interview with Barbara Allison-Bryan, M.D. (Mar. 23, 
2008). 
 53. Kapp, supra note 4, at 249. 
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provided.”54  Because he no longer gave glowing recommendations 
about the drug, the opportunities for monetary rewards ceased. 
Pharmaceutical companies have developed numerous ways to try to 
influence physicians in their prescribing habits, including detailing, 
freebies, samples, meals, trips, as well as payments for training 
presentations, speeches, and continuing medical education programs.  
Nearly every practicing physician is exposed to at least one or more, if 
not all of these marketing techniques.55  Although the effects of these 
practices on physician behavior have already been implied, the next 
section will discuss the direct impact these marketing practices have on 
medical care. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING ON PATIENT CARE 
It should be acknowledged that benefits, beyond increasing the 
revenue of pharmaceutical companies, can flow from pharmaceutical 
marketing.  Some studies have uncovered “a positive [correlation] 
between high promotional spending” and the entry of new companies 
and drugs into the market, with the marketing efforts enhancing 
competition within the industry.56  In addition, advertising by 
pharmaceutical companies in medical journals has decreased the price of 
journal subscriptions.57  Marketing also generates necessary income to 
fund research and development on new drugs.58  As explained by one 
commentator: 
Pharmaceutical [research and development] is a tedious process, 
requiring extensive expenditures of time and money, yet uncovering 
very few successful products.  Therefore, when a company develops 
what seems to be an innovative chemical compound with unique 
therapeutic applications, it must recoup enough of its costs to pay for its 
numerous and expensive failed attempts.  Moreover, a company with a 
new product must recoup these costs during the seventeen or eighteen 
years of the patent term, before the generic drug makers assume their 
                                                          
 54. Carlat, supra note 31, at 69. 
 55. Because CME is mandatory for physicians to maintain their license, it would be very 
surprising if any physician could completely cut off his or her exposure to pharmaceutical 
marketing. 
 56. Fisher, supra note 13, at 225 (citing P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 448 (3d ed. 
1988)); see also Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and Generic Entry in 
the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1103 (2000). 
 57. E. de Laat et al., How Does Pharmaceutical Marketing Influence Doctors’ Prescribing 
Behaviour?, CPB REPORT: QUARTERLY REVIEW OF CPB NETH. BUREAU ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
56, 64 (2002) (discussing research conducted in American journals). 
 58. Fisher, supra note 13, at 222. 
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portion of the market.  At the same time, producers run the risk that 
another manufacturer will create a more effective patentable product 
for the same illness.  This entire process has an extremely short fuse, 
and the need for companies to expend large sums for rapid-fire 
marketing is obvious.59 
Pharmaceutical marketing also allows physicians to learn about the 
newest approaches and drugs on the market.  For medications to be able 
to help patients, physicians must learn about their availability.60  It is 
both expensive to communicate this information to physicians, and 
expensive (in terms of lost time) for physicians to absorb the 
information.61  Pharmaceutical companies may be in the best position to 
bear the costs of transmitting this information and should be able to play 
a pivotal role in this dissemination.62  Furthermore, traditionally, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer must warn the physician of the side effects 
and other risks of their prescription drugs.63  Marketing drugs, especially 
through detailers or lectures, gives companies the opportunity to do this, 
although in practice the conversations between detailers or lecturers and 
physicians may not fully or even adequately supply the needed 
information.64 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 222–23 (citing Prescription Drug Cost Increases: Factors and Trends: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 
262–64 (1987) (testimony of Gerald Mossinghoff)); see also FELDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 453 (“The 
uncertainty of returns to research and development expenditures contains an element of risk that is 
perhaps greater than in other industries.”); Prafulla Joglekar & Morton L. Paterson, A Closer Look at 
the Returns and Risks of Pharmaceutical R&D, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 153, 175 (1986) (noting that 
“only one in three” new chemical entities offers a better return than an investment in a bond, “and 
the odds of exceeding it by an appreciable degree are small indeed”).  Cf. Marcia Angell, Excess in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 171 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 1451, 1451 (2004) (“Although the 
pharmaceutical industry claims to be a high-risk business, year after year drug companies enjoy 
higher profits than any other industry.  In 2002, for example, the top 10 drug companies in the United 
States had a median profit margin of 17%, compared with only 3.1% for all the other industries on 
the Fortune 500 list.” (citing N. Pattison & L. Warren, 2002 Drug Industry Profits: Hefty 
Pharmaceutical Company Margins Dwarf Other Industries, Public Citizen Congress Watch (June 
2003), available at www.citizen.org/documents/Pharma_Report.pdf)). 
 60. See Paul H. Rubin, Pharmaceutical Marketing: Medical and Industry Biases, 13 J. 
PHARMA. FIN., ECON. & POL’Y 65, 65 (2004). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id.  He also notes that what may appear as “bribery” could be viewed as compensation to 
the physicians for the opportunity cost of time to learn about drugs.  Id. 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 (1998); Ozlem A. Bordes, The Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Should the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer Be Shielded from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 286 (2004). 
 64. Another means of distributing information about the availability of medications is for 
pharmaceutical companies to convey this information directly to patients through Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising (DTCA) campaigns.  However, DTCA has generated criticism.  See Thomas 
L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say 
No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That Are Not Medically Indicated, 39(2) SETON 
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In short, some effects of marketing may be beneficial.  However, the 
negative impacts of pharmaceutical marketing are significant and have 
been the source of considerable concern.  The AMA has stated that 
pharmaceutical marketing can hurt the physician-patient relationship 
because “[w]hen physicians accept personal inducements, others 
[including patients] may perceive that the physicians will not fulfill their 
professional obligations appropriately and fairly.”65  The American 
Medical Student Association echoes this sentiment: “By taking gifts, 
[physicians] are willingly choosing to practice industry-centered, rather 
than patient-centered, medicine.”66 
Simply put, pharmaceutical marketing impacts physicians’ 
prescribing practices.67  Multiple studies have found that pharmaceutical 
marketing, including the distribution of “freebies”—even if the financial 
value of the gifts is negligible—taints physicians’ medical judgment.68  
For example, a study by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation “examined the 
impact [of] . . . all-expenses-paid trips to popular Sunbelt vacation sites 
                                                                                                                       
HALL L. REV. (forthcoming April 2009).  Some pharmaceutical companies have used marketing 
resources to test Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) campaigns on physicians.  W. John 
Thomas, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Catalyst for a Change in the Therapeutic 
Model in Psychotherapy?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 209, 217 (1999) (citing Abigail Zuger, Fever Pitch: 
Getting Doctors to Prescribe Is Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A1).  Although these 
meetings give physicians a chance to offer feedback and thereby alleviate some physicians’ concerns 
regarding a given DTCA campaign, these “information management” sessions also give sales 
representatives another opportunity to “push their wares.”  Id. at 245. 
 65. Beverley D. Rowley et al., Professionalism and Gifts to Physicians from Industry, in AM. 
MED. ASS’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT GIFTS TO PHYSICIANS FROM INDUSTRY (2003), at 
36, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/437/ama_m3_pg.pdf. 
 66. American Medical Student Association, Physician-Industry Relationships . . ., http:// 
www.amsa.org/prof/PharmFreeCheatSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 67. Calabro, supra note 4, at 2257 (“Pharmaceutical companies are exerting increasing pressure 
on physicians’ prescription patterns through various means, including providing gifts and other 
benefits for brand loyalty.”). 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 2259 (“[Marketing undermines] the ability of the physician to make 
independent determinations concerning the patient’s well-being and to function as a learned 
intermediary.”); Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to 
Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252 (2003); Fisher, supra note 13, at 213 (Freebies “taint 
the prescribing process and prevent doctors from making objective assessments of the optimal 
prescribing choices for their patients.”); Kapp, supra note 4, at 249–50 (“[T]here is substantial social 
science evidence that the subtle, frequently unconscious influence of drug company gifts on 
physician prescribing behavior may be quite real and powerful. . . .  [I]t appears that the size of the 
gift does not determine the response; in other words, even gifts of negligible financial value can 
influence the behavior of the recipient in ways that the recipient does not realize.”); Jerome P. 
Kassirer, Financial Indigestion, 284 JAMA 2156, 2156 (2000); Dana Katz et al., All Gifts Large and 
Small, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2001); Lori-Ann Rickard & Amy Fehn, Recent Developments in 
Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, J. HEALTH L., Dec. 2006, at 16 (“[P]hysician’s 
prescribing practices are, in fact, affected by interactions with drug companies.”); Ashley Wazana, 
Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 373 
(2000).  But see Katherine S. Mangan, Strong Medicine for Doctors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 9, 
2004, at A28. 
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to attend symposia sponsored by a pharmaceutical company” on the 
prescribing patterns of physicians.69  The study tracked the pharmacies’ 
“usage reports for two drugs before and after the symposia.”70  Despite 
the physicians asserting that the symposia would not alter their 
prescribing patterns, a sizable increase in the prescribing pattern of both 
drugs occurred following the symposia, which was “significantly 
different from the national usage patterns of the two drugs by hospitals 
[and other] major medical centers over the same period of time.”71 
Pharmaceutical marketing has also affected the total number of 
prescriptions written.  Instead of opting for “less risky or expensive 
approaches” to a medical condition, “such as changes in diet and 
exercise,” often physicians, influenced by marketing, opt for 
medications.72  Even though, in the last decade, the U.S. population has 
grown by only nine percent, written prescriptions have increased by 
seventy percent.73  Though this could partially be due to an increase in 
the number of Americans receiving regular health care and to changes in 
treatment approaches, these explanations are unlikely to account for most 
of this increase. 
According to the national president of the American Medical Student 
Association, Dr. Michael Ehlert, “marketing practices . . . [have] led to 
over-medicating of the U.S. population.”74  Additionally, pharmaceutical 
companies exert pressure on doctors to switch patients’ prescriptions.75  
“[D]octors are regularly bombarded with letters, calls and faxes—many 
including offers of cash payments—urging them to stop prescribing  
 
                                                          
 69. James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on 
Physician Prescribing Patterns: There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 102 CHEST J. 270, 270 
(1992). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Rebecca Dresser, Pharmaceutical Company Gifts: From Voluntary Standards to Legal 
Demands, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2006, at 8. 
 73. Press Release, American Medical Student Association, Thousands of Medical Students Call 
on Schools to Eliminate Pharmaceutical Marketing Influence (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.amsa.org/ 
news/release2.cfx?id=322. 
 74. Id.; see also David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug Companies, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1885, 1885 (2004) (“[T]he marketing by the drug industry of its products to physicians is manifestly 
aimed also at improving industry profits; in the process, such marketing may contribute to less 
savory social consequences, including increasing drug costs and the misuse or overuse of 
medications in ways that may adversely affect patients.”). 
 75. Peter Keating, Why You May be Getting the Wrong Medicine: A Money Investigation 
Reveals How Big Drug Companies Are Pressuring Doctors, Pharmacists and Insurers to Push 
Prescriptions that Benefit Company Bottom Lines—But May Also Harm Your Health, MONEY, June 
1, 1997, at 142. 
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certain medications in favor of others.”76  In short, this marketing has 
affected physicians’ prescribing practices.77 
These findings make intuitive sense as well.  Pharmaceutical 
companies are driven largely by the need to generate profits from their 
activities.  The only justification for spending over $12 billion a year on 
physician marketing must be that it positively impacts sales revenues.  
Otherwise, pharmaceutical companies would likely curtail this 
expenditure, thereby adding that $12 billion to their bottom line. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, sampling, in particular, is troubling as a 
number of studies have shown that it does not accomplish its stated 
goals, which are purportedly to allow physicians to try new drugs and to 
provide needed medications to indigent patients who otherwise could not 
afford them.  For example, in a randomized trial, researchers from the 
University of Minnesota found that medical residents who used samples 
were less likely to prescribe cheaper, over the counter medications, and 
more likely to prescribe advertised drugs than residents who agreed not 
to use samples.78  Another study found that 91% of physicians dispensed 
a sample that differed from their preferred drug choice when treating 
hypertension.79  Finally, a third study found that when sample use was 
barred from a physician’s practice, use of an alternative generally 
recommended first-line antihypertensive drug increased from 38% to 
61%.80 
Another justification given for sampling, as noted, is to enable 
physicians to pass medications along to indigent patients.81  This is 
commendable in theory; however, in practice this frequently does not 
occur.  Studies found that 96% of physicians and staff have taken 
samples for personal or family use in the preceding year,82 that almost 
                                                          
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Richard F. Adair & Leah R. Holmgren, Do Drug Samples Influence Resident Prescribing 
Behavior? A Randomized Trial, 118 AM. J. MED. 881, 882–83 (2005). 
 79. Lisa D. Chew et al., A Physician Survey of the Effect of Drug Sample Availability on 
Physicians’ Behavior, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 478, 478 (2000). 
 80. John M. Boltri et al., Effect of Antihypertensive Samples on Physician Prescribing Patterns, 
34 FAMILY MED. 729, 729 (2002); see also David P. Miller et al., The Impact of Drug Samples on 
Prescribing to the Uninsured, 101 S. MED. J. 888, 891 (2008) (“[P]hysicians are over three times 
more likely to prescribe generic medications to uninsured patients when drug samples are not 
available . . . .”).  
 81. Interview with Barbara Allison-Bryan, M.D. (Nov. 12, 2007). 
 82. See John M. Westfall et al., Personal Use of Drug Samples by Physicians and Office Staff, 
278 JAMA 141, 142 (1997); see also Rita Rubin, Doctors Ditch Drug Samples to Avoid Influencing 
Treatment, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-11-30-drug-
samples_n.htm (“‘[Drug samples are] an unacknowledged gift for physicians and their staff and their 
families to use.’” (quoting Adriane Fugh-Berman, Georgetown University Medical Center physician 
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60% of pharmaceutical representatives provided samples “to individuals 
other than physicians,” and that almost 50% of pharmaceutical 
representatives had “self medicated or provided samples to friends or 
relatives.”83  This is not only an inappropriate use of these samples, it can 
be criminal.84 
It is likely that pharmaceutical marketing capitalizes on the 
availability heuristic, which posits that people base their prediction of the 
frequency or likelihood of an event on how easily an example can be 
brought to mind.85  Physicians may be conditioned to diagnose certain 
diseases or illnesses because marketing has made a physician more likely 
to be thinking of a specific disorder and jump to conclusions about a 
possible diagnosis and the course of treatment to be employed.  Although 
instances of outright medical error because of pharmaceutical marketing 
are difficult, if not impossible, to identify, it is not hard to envision them 
occurring.86 
Even if pharmaceutical marketing has not significantly decreased the 
quality of medical care in this country, marketing to physicians does 
                                                                                                                       
and director of PharmedOut, a “publicly funded project to inform doctors about drugmakers’ 
influence”)). 
 83. Kevin L. Tong & Chia-Yen Lien, Do Pharmaceutical Representatives Misuse Their Drug 
Samples?, 41 CAN. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1363, 1363 (1995); see also Sarah L. Cutrona et al., 
Characteristics of Recipients of Free Prescription Drug Samples: A Nationally Representative 
Analysis, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 284, 287 (2008) [hereinafter Cutrona et al., Characteristics] (“We 
found that 12% of US residents received free samples during 2003 but less than one third of all 
sample recipients were low income and less than one fifth of all sample recipients were uninsured at 
any point during the year.”); Sarah L. Cutrona et al., Free Drug Samples in the United States: 
Characteristics of Pediatric Recipients and Safety Concerns, 122 PEDIATRICS 736, 742 (2008) 
[hereinafter Cutrona et al., Free Drug Samples] (“Our study demonstrates that poor and uninsured 
children are not the main recipients of free drug samples.  Free samples go primarily to children with 
the best access to health care; their distribution does not equalize medication access.”). 
 84. See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
 85. See generally John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the 
Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
88 (1978). 
 86. See Monja L. Proctor et al., Incidence of Medical Error and Adverse Outcomes on a 
Pediatric General Surgery Service, 38 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 1361, 1363 (2003) (“Although it is 
widely recognized that medical error is a significant public health concern, it is difficult to estimate 
the actual incidence of medical error.  Not all mistakes in medical management cause measurable 
harm to patients, yet most have that potential.  Conversely, not all harm caused to patients by 
medical treatment results from preventable error.  For example, prophylactic antibiotics, when 
indicated, should be administered before making the incision.  Failure to administer the antibiotic at 
the appropriate time is an error, regardless of whether the patient develops a postoperative wound 
infection, whereas a wound infection may still occur in the absence of any identified error in 
treatment.  The incidence of medical error reported in previous studies has varied from 3% to 50%, 
depending on study design and criteria.”); see also Cutrona et al., Free Drug Samples, supra note 83, 
at 736 (“[N]umerous adult studies suggest that free samples influence the prescribing behavior of 
physicians and trainees.  Physicians alter their prescribing patterns when using samples, choosing 
medications that are more expensive, less likely to be first-line agents, and less likely to be 
consistent with the physicians’ own, self-described, prescribing preferences.” (citations omitted)). 
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have a significant impact on the cost of care.  For example, marketing 
promotes the use of brand-name medications over generic drugs, even 
though the latter are considerably cheaper.87  Despite the fact that over 
70% of prescriptions are written for drugs for which both generic and 
brand-name versions are available, fewer than 30% of prescriptions are 
written for the generic version.88  Because manufacturers of generic 
drugs spend significantly less on marketing than their brand-name 
counterparts, doctors are probably “less likely to think of generic 
alternatives” when writing prescriptions.89 
In a relatively recent analysis of Medicaid prescription drug 
spending, two researchers from Brigham and Women’s Hospital noted 
that potential savings of $229 million could have been realized from 
greater use of generic drugs within the Medicaid programs alone.90  Most 
of these unrealized savings were concentrated in a small group of 
medicines, including Clozaril (clozapine), Xanax (alprazolam), and 
Levoxyl (levothyroxine),91 each of which has been heavily marketed by 
their respective pharmaceutical companies.92  A physician’s tendency to 
prescribe more costly, name-brand medications because of 
pharmaceutical marketing is worrisome, especially as health care costs, 
particularly those for drugs, are soaring.93 
                                                          
 87. Jennifer S. Haas et al., Potential Savings from Substituting Generic Drugs for Brand-Name 
Drugs: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 1997–2000, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 891, 891 
(2005) (finding that sixty-one percent of multisource drugs were dispensed as generic).  “If a generic 
had been substituted for all corresponding brand-name outpatient drugs in 2000, the median annual 
savings in drug expenditures per person would have been $45.89 . . . for adults younger than 65 
years of age and $78.05 . . . for adults at least 65 years of age.”  Id.  “While the per capita savings of 
generic substitution appear modest, national savings would be substantial: about $6 billion for adults 
younger than age 65 years and about $3 billion for older adults.”  Id. at 892.  Generic drugs are 
generally 30–60% cheaper than their brand-name equivalents.  Judith K. Hellerstein, The Importance 
of the Physician in the Generic Versus Trade-Name Prescription Decision, 29 RAND J. ECON. 108, 
108 (1998) (citing Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J. L. & ECON. 331 (1992)). 
 88. Hellerstein, supra note 87, at 108. 
 89. Benjamin P. Falit, Curbing Industry Sponsors’ Incentive to Design Post-Approval Trials 
that are Suboptimal for Informing Prescribers but More Likely than Optimal Designs to Yield 
Favorable Results, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 969, 1001 (2007). 
 90. Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Economic Consequences of Underuse of Generic 
Drugs: Evidence from Medicaid and Implications for Prescription Drug Benefit Plans, 38 HEALTH 
SERVS. RES. 1051, 1055 (2003). 
 91. Id. at 1056, 1058 tbl. 3. 
 92. Illustrative of this are websites targeted specifically at physicians.  See, e.g., Clozaril,  
http://www.clozaril.com/hcp/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008), Xanax XR, http://www.xanax 
.com/infopro/index.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008), Levoxyl, http://www.levoxyl.com/hcp/1.0_ 
phys_info.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).  These drugs have also been heavily detailed.  Interview 
with Barbara Allison-Bryan, M.D. (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 93. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the United States spent approximately 
15% on health expenditures in 2004 as compared with 8.5% in 1980.  Other Organisation for 
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And finally, with all of the mainstream press coverage of 
pharmaceutical marketing to physicians,94 there is an appearance of 
impropriety.  It can be expected that patients will begin to question the 
allegiance of their doctors and to doubt the quality and independence of 
their medical judgment.  Many believe that “[t]hese interactions are 
eroding the public’s trust in the medical profession.”95  As the American 
College of Physicians has noted, “[a] perception that a physician is 
dispensing medical advice on the basis of a commercial influence is 
likely to undermine a patient’s trust not only in the physician’s 
competence but also in the physician’s pledge to put patients’ welfare 
ahead of self-interest.”96 
Physicians share these concerns about the negative impacts of 
pharmaceutical marketing.  A study published in the Yale Journal of 
Health Policy Law and Ethics found that physicians have negative or, at 
best, neutral attitudes about pharmaceutical sales representatives.97  The 
authors reported that when drug promotion is emphasized, physicians 
leave the interaction with a more negative attitude than if the 
presentation had been more focused on information and educational 
support.98  Advocacy groups composed of physicians are also vocal in 
claiming that “pharmaceutical companies continually mislead physicians 
                                                                                                                       
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, including Germany, France, Canada, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom have increased their respective spending by only 1 or 2%.  In 
2004, Americans spent nearly $7,000 per capita on total annual health care, outspending all other 
OECD countries by approximately $4,000.  In an effort to keep down costs, insurance companies 
have begun having pharmacists provide generic versions of any drug prescribed unless the physician 
specifically insists that the patient receive the brand-name version.  Cathy Schoen et al., U.S. Health 
System Performance: A National Scorecard, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2006 WEB EXCLUSIVES, W457 
(2006); see also Maggie Fox, U.S. Healthcare Expensive, Inefficient: Report, REUTERS, May 15, 
2007 (“Americans get the poorest health care and yet pay the most compared to five other rich 
countries . . . .”). 
 The increased influence of managed care organizations and other third-party payors of health 
care costs has resulted in physicians and consumers being increasingly pressured to use less 
expensive generic drugs, but this, in turn, has led pharmaceutical manufacturers to focus more of 
their marketing attention on these third-party payors, potentially mitigating any savings.  See 
generally Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R. Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs Is Revolutionizing 
the Drug Industry, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 177 (1995). 
 94. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 95. Testimony on State Laws Requiring Disclosure of Pharmaceutical Company Payments to 
Physicians: Testimony before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 24 (2007) [hereinafter 
Congressional Testimony] (testimony of Peter Lurie, Joseph S. Ross, Adina H. Rosenbaum, and 
Jason Krigel), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_ 
hearings&docid=f:39865.pdf. 
 96. Coyle, supra note 38, at 397. 
 97. Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician 
Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 785, 787 (2005). 
 98. Id. at 789–90. 
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by feeding them erroneous information through their sales 
representatives or [by] failing to disclose vital information regarding the 
drug’s safety.”99  In October 2007, the American Medical Student 
Association sponsored “PharmFree Week,” calling upon medical schools 
to eliminate pharmaceutical marketing from their campuses and to 
“promote liberation from pharmaceutical company influence.”100  The 
week’s activities included congressional lobbying and a symposium to 
“provide skills [to physicians] to become more critical and evidence-
based prescribers.”101  Physicians have also used various medical 
journals to bring attention to the pharmaceutical industry’s negative 
impact on CME programs, and patient care more generally.102  But 
recognition has grown that mere physician and public awareness of the 
deleterious impact of pharmaceutical marketing is not enough and a 
number of measures have been introduced in an effort to curb this 
impact. 
IV. EXISTING EFFORTS TO CURB PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING 
As will be discussed below, professional organizations such as the 
AMA, the federal and state governments, and even the pharmaceutical 
industry through the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA),103 have embraced efforts to deter some of the 
unacceptably close ties between the pharmaceutical industry and 
physicians.104  The failure of some physicians to voluntarily curtail these 
unacceptable behaviors has triggered the progressive imposition of legal 
norms and more fully developed ethical guidelines.105 
                                                          
 99. Neil F. Hazaray, Note, Do the Benefits Outweigh the Risks? The Legal, Business, and 
Ethical Ramifications of Pulling a Blockbuster Drug Off the Market, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 115, 
144 (2007). 
 100. American Medical Student Association, supra note 73. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Relman, supra note 43; Samuel Packer & David Parke, Ethical Concerns in 
Industry Support of Continuing Medical Education: The Con Side, 122 ARCHIVES 
OPHTHALMOLOGY 773 (2004). 
 103. PhRMA is a coalition of pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies.  PhRMA 
advocates for public policies “that encourage discovery of important new medicines for patients by 
pharmaceutical/biotechnology research companies.”  PhRMA, About PHRMA, http://www.phrma. 
org/about_phrma/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
 104. Studdert et al., supra note 51, at 1891. 
 105. Id. at 1892. 
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A. Federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
Using anti-kickback provisions and false claims laws, federal 
prosecutors have begun pursuing cases involving improper interactions 
between physicians and pharmaceutical companies.  Passed in 1972, the 
federal anti-kickback statute106 was intended to protect the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs from inappropriate requests for reimbursement by 
imposing sanctions on suppliers who have sought to induce unnecessary 
orders for health care products or services by providing remuneration to 
physicians in exchange for their prescribing these products or services.107  
“Giving, accepting, or offering to give or accept such remuneration can 
result in [significant] criminal and civil penalties.”108  Until the early 
1990s, federal prosecutors invoked this law only when “there was clearly 
an intent to increase referrals—for example, situations in which one 
physician kicked back a portion of the Medicare payment for a [medical 
device] to the referring physician or a drug retailer paid a nursing home a 
monthly fee for the right to act as the facility’s preferred supplier.”109 
In April 2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services issued a document for 
pharmaceutical companies that explained “which industry practices are 
likely to provoke [federal] prosecution,” as well as a series of factors that 
will influence prosecutorial decisions.110  Notably, physicians appear to 
be just as liable to prosecution as pharmaceutical companies if the OIG 
determines that their relationship with a pharmaceutical company is 
suspect.111  Unless the relationship between a pharmaceutical company 
and a physician fits within one of several statutory “safe harbors” as 
outlined in the anti-kickback statute,112 the government will weigh four 
factors in deciding whether a payment to a physician constitutes a 
kickback: 
[1.] Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to interfere with, 
or skew, clinical decision-making?  Does it have a potential to 
                                                          
 106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a, 1320a-7b (2000). 
 107. Studdert et al., supra note 51, at 1892. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 110. Id.; OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 
23,731 (May 5, 2003). 
 111. Studdert et al., supra note 51, at 1898. 
 112. These include: “personal services and management contracts, 42 CFR 1001.952(d), 
warranties, 42 CFR 1001.952(g), discounts, 42 CFR 1001.952(h), . . . and certain managed care and 
risk sharing arrangements, 42 CFR 1001.952(m), (t) & (u).”  OIG Compliance Program, supra note 
110, at 23,734. 
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undermine the clinical integrity of a formulary process?  If the 
arrangement or practice involves providing information to decision-
makers, prescribers, or patients, is the information complete, accurate, 
and not misleading? 
[2.] Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase costs 
to the federal health care programs, beneficiaries, or enrollees?  Does 
the arrangement or practice have the potential to be a disguised 
discount to circumvent the Medicaid Rebate Program Best Price 
calculation? 
[3.] Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase the 
risk of overutilization or inappropriate utilization? [and] 
[4.] Does the arrangement or practice raise patient safety or quality of 
care concerns?113 
The document also directs that the grant-making functions and the sales 
and marketing functions within pharmaceutical companies be separated 
to ensure that the latter does not influence the substance of an 
educational program.114  The guidance also cautions these companies to 
ensure that organizers of conferences for continuing medical education 
are not improperly channeling money to physicians.115 
With respect to funding research, the OIG specifies that 
“manufacturers [should] develop contracting procedures that clearly 
separate the awarding of research contracts from marketing”116 and 
“[r]esearch contracts that originate through the sales or marketing 
functions . . . are particularly suspect.”117  Consulting or advisory 
services that result in “fair market value payments to small numbers of 
physicians . . . are unlikely to raise[] concern[s],” but paying physicians 
as consultants to attend meetings and engaging physicians to work in 
manufacturers’ marketing and sales activities are practices that are more 
suspect.118  Entertainment, recreation, travel, meals, gifts, and gratuities 
for physicians are all potentially subject to anti-kickback prohibitions.119 
 
                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 23,735. 
 115. Id. at 23,738.  The code of conduct of the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical 
Education is referred to as a “useful starting point” for pharmaceutical companies in determining 
what constitutes an improper channeling of funds to physicians.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 23,735–36. 
 117. Id. at 23,736. 
 118. Id. at 23,738. 
 119. Id. at 23,737. 
09.0_HAFEMEISTER FINAL 3/7/2009  12:09:56 PM 
2009] BEWARE THOSE BEARING GIFTS 511 
In this attempt to regulate industry practices through federal law, the 
government has been successful in deterring and imposing sanctions on 
the most egregious abuses.  But because the anti-kickback statute is 
applicable only when a federally or state funded health-care program is 
involved,120 it is a relatively ineffective means for curbing abuses 
associated with the marketing of medications to physicians in general. 
B. Codes and Guidelines Generated by Professional Organizations 
Pharmaceutical companies are aware of the criticism their marketing 
has engendered and the emerging federal and state responses.  They also 
recognize that excessive marketing practices may undermine the 
protection from liability afforded them by the learned intermediary 
doctrine.121  As a result, their primary national organization, PhRMA, 
adopted a Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals in July 
2002.  It emphasizes that interactions between pharmaceutical companies 
and health care providers should be focused on providing scientific and 
educational information, that meetings should occur at venues conducive 
to providing this scientific or educational information, and that 
“entertainment” such as “dine and dash” (meals paid for by 
pharmaceutical companies that have little or no educational component) 
and recreational events like sporting events or spa visits should not 
occur.122  The PhRMA Code also states that although it is acceptable for 
pharmaceutical companies to continue to provide support for continuing 
education programs directly to the sponsors of these programs, 
pharmaceutical companies should not fund the attendance of individual 
participants.123 
However, adherence to these recommendations is only voluntary124 
and the PhRMA Code does not address clinical investigations or 
consulting payments like those paid to Dr. Carlat for his lunch time 
presentations.  As one commentator pointed out, the guidelines have no 
legal enforceability and “[i]f following the guidelines would put a 
                                                          
 120. Calabro, supra note 4, at 2261. 
 121. See id. at 2264. 
 122. See PhRMA Code, supra note 50, at 5. 
 123. See id. at 6.  Starting January 1, 2009, PhRMA also called for a voluntary moratorium on 
“reminder items” such as branded pens, staplers, flash drives, paperweights, calculators, and 
notepads.  Ceci Connolly, With More Oversight on the Horizon, Drugmakers Work to Polish Image, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, at A01; Singer, supra note 4, at A1. 
 124. Provision fifteen of the PhRMA Code regarding adherence only states that “[a]ll companies 
that interact with health care professionals about pharmaceuticals should adopt procedures to assure 
adherence to this Code.”  PhRMA Code, supra note 50, at 14. 
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company at a competitive disadvantage . . . [it] has little choice but to 
ignore [them].”125 
Subsequent to PhRMA’s adoption of its Code, the AMA overhauled 
its own respective ethical code relating to interactions between 
physicians and pharmaceutical companies.126  The AMA’s guidelines, 
adopted in 2004, speak in broad, exhortatory language that calls for 
caregivers “to place the health and welfare of the patient ahead of [their 
own] economic self-interest.”  According to the guidelines, “gifts 
accepted by physicians . . . should not be of substantial value” and 
meetings should be “held at an appropriate location, [and] promot[e] 
objective scientific and educational activities and discourse.”127  
Meetings should also provide a disclosure of entities providing financial 
support or potential conflicts of interest.128  Like the PhRMA Code, the 
AMA’s guidelines also contain provisions regarding travel expenses, 
quid pro quo gifts, and scholarships.129  The guidelines state that 
subsidies from pharmaceutical companies should not be accepted “for 
the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal expenses of physicians 
attending conferences or meetings.”130  Quid pro quo gifts are not 
permitted, but scholarships that would “permit medical students, 
residents, and fellows to attend . . . educational conferences may be 
permissible as long as the selection of students, residents, or fellows . . . 
is made by the academic or training institution.”131 
As Studdert notes, “[t]he resulting statements [of PhRMA and the 
AMA] share a focus . . . [;] [t]hough the statements differ in scope and 
specificity, the harmony is striking among the recommendations.”132  
These largely parallel codes suggest that there is a consensus within the 
field that physicians should avoid these marketing efforts; those that do 
not avoid them violate a professional and, as will be argued, a legal duty 
to their patients. 
 
                                                          
 125. Millrood, supra note 4. 
 126. Studdert et al., supra note 51, at 1898. 
 127. AM. MED. ASS’N CODE, supra note 50. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Studdert et al., supra note 51, at 1898. 
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C. State and Federal Legislative Efforts 
State legislatures have also tried to control the adverse effects of 
pharmaceutical marketing by enacting laws that limit what 
pharmaceutical companies can give to physicians and, in some 
jurisdictions, even mandate that permitted gifts be reported.  To date, at 
least six states have passed legislation that attempts to curtail the 
negative effects of pharmaceutical marketing to physicians: California, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia, as well 
as the District of Columbia. 
California’s legislation stands out as it converts the existing 
voluntary industry codes into legally binding standards.133  The 
legislation “requires pharmaceutical companies to adopt and publicly 
disclose a comprehensive compliance program” that meets the PhRMA 
Code, as well as the standards outlined by the Final OIG Guidance, 
“establish specific annual dollar limits on gifts [and] incentives provided 
to health care professionals,” and make public “an annual declaration of 
compliance.”134  However, this statute is not without flaw.  First, 
“pharmaceutical company” is defined broadly; it is ambiguous if “out-of-
state pharmaceutical companies doing business in California” are 
included.135  Second, “requiring pharmaceutical companies to comply 
with the Final OIG Guidance is difficult because [the OIG] merely 
provided recommendations and not ‘requirements.’”136  According to 
commentators, “pharmaceutical manufacturers [may have] a tough 
time . . . discerning the subtle differences.”137 
Massachusetts has recently addressed the problem of pharmaceutical 
marketing through legislation.  On August 10, 2008, Governor Deval 
Patrick signed into law Senate Bill 2863, which requires the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH) to establish a 
pharmaceutical and medical device marketing code of conduct.138  It 
imposes compliance and reporting requirements on pharmaceutical and 
medical device companies that employ a person to sell or market 
prescription drugs or medical devices in the state.  The conduct of these 
                                                          
 133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 119400, 119402 (West 2005); Jonathan K. Henderson & 
Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006: Cutting Edge Legal and Regulatory Issues in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 145 (2006). 
 134. Henderson & Cassady, supra note 133, at 145. 
 135. Id. at 146. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Todd Wallack, Tied Up Over Disclosure: Life Sciences Firms Anxious About Rules on Gifts 
to Doctors, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2008, at C1. 
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employees must at least meet the PhRMA Code and similar guidelines 
issued by the Advanced Medical Technology Association.  And, the 
statute establishes certain specific prohibitions, some of which are more 
restrictive than the PhRMA Code.139 
However, the Massachusetts statute does not impose a deadline for 
the development of the DPH marketing code (although the law does 
require that once the DPH code is established it must be updated every 
two years).140  This may allow the DPH (which may be strapped for time 
and resources) to significantly delay the writing and implementation of 
this code. 
The other four states, and the District of Columbia, have passed 
various statutes that require pharmaceutical companies to disclose 
payments, or other items of value, made to physicians.141  Each law has 
its own combination of requirements, but generally mandates some 
combination of disclosure to a state government agency, the public, or 
the state legislature.142  Included in the report (depending on the specific 
law) may be a requisite itemized report of each payment.143 
These statutes mark progress.  They strive “to increase the 
transparency” of interactions between physicians and pharmaceutical 
companies.144  However, they “all fall well short” of what needs to be 
accomplished.145  Inexplicably, none of the statutes calls for the reporting 
of payments relating to the marketing of biologics (a biological product 
like a vaccine or blood serum);146 and only Massachusetts’s addresses 
medical devices.147  Two of the six states (Minnesota and West Virginia) 
do not mandate individualized reporting of payments, permitting reports 
                                                          
 139. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111N, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 2009).  For example, the 
Massachusetts law prohibits the “provision of or payment for meals directly at any CME event, 
third-party scientific or educational conferences, or professional meetings.”  Id. § 2(6).  The PhRMA 
Code contains no similar provision. 
 140. Id. § 2. 
 141. See D.C. CODE § 48-833 (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2698-A (2004); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.47 (West 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2005 (2007); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 5A-3C-13 (West Supp. 2008). 
 142. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 (requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers distributing 
drugs in the District of Columbia to report marketing costs to the District of Columbia Department 
of Health); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.47.1(f) (requiring that wholesale drug distributors file with a 
state board the nature and value of payments over $100 to practitioners in Minnesota and stating that 
this information is public). 
 143. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.03 (“[T]he annual report filed . . . shall include the following 
information as it pertains to marketing activities conducted within the District in a form that provides 
the value, nature, purpose, and recipient of the expense.”). 
 144. Congressional Testimony, supra note 95. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 111N, § 2(8) (effective Jan. 1, 2009). 
09.0_HAFEMEISTER FINAL 3/7/2009  12:09:56 PM 
2009] BEWARE THOSE BEARING GIFTS 515 
to be aggregated “either across payment type or by physician.”148  West 
Virginia’s statute is one of the weakest: “each company is required only 
to report (in dollar ranges) the total value of payments in that year and 
the number of physicians who received payments”; the names of 
physicians who received payments are not required.149  Furthermore, 
West Virginia has no enforcement mechanism available under its law to 
sanction a failure to report.150 
“Although these statutes typically require that food, travel, and 
honoraria [or] consulting fees be reported, exclusions from mandated 
reporting are common.”151  As the authors of a 2007 report (i.e., prior to 
the Massachusetts enactment) analyzing the statutory provisions of the 
District of Columbia, Maine, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia 
found: “[t]he threshold for any reporting ranges from $25 (District of 
Columbia, Maine, and Vermont) to $100 (Minnesota and West Virginia).  
Four states (all except Minnesota) exempt certain payments related to 
medical conferences and research studies from the reporting requirement, 
and all exempt free samples for patients.”152 
“Only the [Massachusetts and] Minnesota statutes make[] all the 
disclosed information part of the public record, without exception, 
although the remaining four states require annual summary reports to the 
legislature.  A model statute would require both.”153 
A comparable statute was proposed to the United States Congress on 
July 12, 2007, by Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR).154  Entitled the  
 
                                                          
 148. Congressional Testimony, supra note 95; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.47.1(f) (West 2005) 
(permitting aggregation by physician); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5A-3C-13(a) (West Supp. 2008) 
(“Advertising costs for prescription drugs, based on aggregate national data, must be reported to the 
state council . . . .”). 
 149. Congressional Testimony, supra note 95; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5A-3C-13 (West Supp. 
2008). 
 150. Congressional Testimony, supra note 95. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. H.R. 3023, 110th Cong. (2007).  The Senate counterpart was S. 2029, 110th Cong. (2007).  
On January 22, 2009, Senators Charles Grassley (R-IA) and Herb Kohl (D-WI) introduced the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2009, which would require manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, and biologics that receive payments through Medicare, Medicaid, or the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to report to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) anything over $100 in value that they give to physicians, with the DHHS in turn 
directed to make this information available online.  Maribel Rios, Physician Payments Sunshine Act 
Reintroduced for 2009, PHARMTECH.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http://pharmtech.findpharma.com/ 
pharmtech/News/Physician-Payments-Sunshine-Act-Reintroduced-for-2/ArticleStandard/Article/ 
detail/577973?contextCategoryId=35097; S. 301, 111th Cong. (2009).   
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Drug and Medical Device Company Gift Disclosure Act,155 this bill had 
many of the same weaknesses as its state counterparts.  The bill required: 
Each manufacturer . . . of a drug . . . or of a device shall disclose to the 
[Food and Drug Administration] Commissioner . . . the value, nature, 
and purpose of any—(i) gift provided, directly or indirectly, . . . to any 
covered health entity by the manufacturer, packer, or distributor, or a 
representative or agent thereof, in connection with detailing, 
promotional, or other marketing activities; and [any] . . . (ii) cash 
rebate, discount, or any other financial consideration provided during 
the preceding calendar year to any pharmaceutical benefit manager by 
the manufacturer . . . or a representative or agent thereof, in connection 
with detailing, promotional, or other marketing activities. 156 
However, the bill excluded samples, compensation and reimbursements 
for conducting clinical trials, and scholarships to attend an “educational, 
scientific, or policy-making conference.”157  With the exception of trade 
secrets, the bill required the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Commissioner to “make all information disclosed . . . publicly available, 
including . . . posting such information on the Internet,”158 although there 
was no mandated annual report to Congress regarding these disclosures. 
Not requiring disclosures of clinical trials and scholarships presents 
similar problems as the various state statutes do that exempt them.  
Additionally, the provision exempting trade secrets from on-line 
disclosure could have made the bill’s reporting feature meaningless.  The 
pharmaceutical industry would likely attempt to get their marketing 
practices categorized as a trade secret.  If these efforts were routinely 
successful, the effectiveness of the proposed reporting mechanism would 
be significantly curtailed.  Regardless, at the close of the 110th Congress, 
both the House and Senate versions of the bill died in Committee without 
becoming law. 
Though commendable for focusing on the problems associated with 
the marketing of pharmaceuticals to physicians, the federal anti-kickback 
statute, currently existing state legislation, and the bills introduced in the 
House and Senate, each lack sufficient scope and enforceability to be 
effective. 
                                                          
 155. H.R. 3023 § 1. 
 156. Id. § 2; see also Wayne J. Guglielmo, Will Your Free Dinner Appear Online?, MED. ECON., 
Oct. 19, 2007, at 13; Dave Hansen, Bill Would Make Drug Firms Disclose Gifts to Doctors, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007; Dave Hansen, House to Offer Bill for Registry of Drug Firm Gifts to 
Doctors, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 26, 2007. 
 157. H.R. 3023. 
 158. Id. 
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D. Health Systems’ Ban on Physicians Accepting Trinkets 
Some health systems, including those associated with the University 
of California at Davis, Stanford University, Yale University, University 
of Pennsylvania, a group of hospitals and clinics in northern Minnesota, 
and Detroit’s Henry Ford Health Systems have banned the drug 
industry’s practice of giving physicians items of relatively limited value 
(hereinafter referred to as “trinkets”) altogether.159  Physicians from a 
health system in Duluth turned in over 18,000 items they had been given, 
“including clocks, mugs, surgical caps, calculators, tape dispensers, and a 
stress-relieving squeeze toy made to look like a red blood cell.”160  
According to one report, the “backlash against the cozy relationships 
between doctors and drug [manufacturers]”161 became more prominent 
after a 2006 Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 
article stated that “research had shown that even cheap gifts, such as 
pens, can affect [physicians]’ prescribing decisions.”162 
The 2006 JAMA article, entitled Health Industry Practices That 
Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical 
Centers,163 and others164 report that “the impulse to reciprocate for even 
small gifts is a powerful influence on people’s behavior.  Individuals 
receiving gifts are often unable to remain objective; they reweigh 
information and choices in light of the gift.”165 
 
                                                          
 159. Jacob Goldstein, Health System Bans Drug Rep Trinkets, WALL STREET J. HEALTH BLOG, 
Jan. 18, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/01/18/health-system-bans-drug-rep-trinkets/; Steve 
Karnowski, Minnesota Health System Purges Drug Trinkets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008; U.C. Davis 
Health System, UC Davis Health System Bans Receipt of Gifts from All Vendors, July 7, 2007, 
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/welcome/features/20070711_nogifts/; Henry Ford Bans Pharma 
Perks, Vendor Drop-ins, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/henry-ford-bans-
pharma-perks-vendor-drop-ins/2006-12-15; see also Morgan Lewis Jr., Wisconsin Med Society Bans 
Pharma Gifts, MED. ECON., Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/ 
article/articleDetail.jsp?id=569316 (“The Wisconsin Medical Society has prohibited its members 
from accepting gifts—including personal items, office supplies, food, travel and time costs, or 
payment for participation in online continuing medical education—from any provider of products 
that they prescribe to their patients.”). 
 160. Goldstein, supra note 159. 
 161. Karnowski, supra note 159. 
 162. Id. (referring to Troyen Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of 
Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429 (2006)). 
 163. Brennan et al., supra note 162. 
 164. See, e.g., Iserson et al., Politely Refuse the Pen and Note Pad: Gifts from Industry to 
Physicians Harm Patients, 84 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 1077, 1078 (2007) (“Receiving industry 
gifts compromises professionalism and your fiduciary duty to your patients.”). 
 165. Brennan et al., supra note 162, at 431. 
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E. Impact of Legislative and Professional Organization Efforts to Curb 
Pharmaceutical Marketing 
Each of the attempts described above to limit pharmaceutical 
marketing is commendable; however, they have failed to resolve the 
problem.  Anti-kickback statutes, though potentially effective when 
prosecutors target services covered by federal or state funded healthcare 
programs, cannot reach abuses outside this context.  State statutes, in 
addition to being enacted in only a handful of states, are relatively 
limited in scope and fail to address several key marketing channels that 
can compromise the medical judgment of physicians.  Finally, voluntary 
codes adopted by organizations like PhRMA and the AMA are just 
that—voluntary. 
Although some of the more egregious practices, such as free trips to 
golf and ski resorts, may no longer be as prevalent, efforts to date have 
failed to eradicate arguably more subtle forms of pharmaceutical 
marketing that compromise physicians’ medical judgment.  Furthermore, 
the publicity given to pharmaceutical marketing, as well as the potential 
conflict of interests and clouding of physicians’ decision-making that 
may result from this practice, poses the potential to undercut the level of 
trust that patients need to place in their physicians for health care to be 
appropriately delivered.  At the same time, a consensus has emerged 
regarding the dangers of pharmaceutical marketing among physicians 
and the need to curb the abuses that have been associated with it.  This 
consensus has led physicians acting in good faith (and the professional 
organizations that represent them) to voluntarily curb these abuses.  The 
development of this consensus provides the cornerstone for encouraging 
and expecting all physicians to follow this path.  Although 
pharmaceutical companies can and should be deterred from engaging in 
abusive marketing practices, the competitive nature of their enterprise 
and the need to maximize their profit will likely limit the impact of 
efforts to curtail these practices.  In addition, the special nature of the 
patient-physician relationship and the responsibility of physicians to 
protect and promote the interests of their patients places on physicians an 
obligation to avoid situations where pharmaceutical marketing has the 
potential to compromise their medical judgment. 
09.0_HAFEMEISTER FINAL 3/7/2009  12:09:56 PM 
2009] BEWARE THOSE BEARING GIFTS 519 
V. A FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Ethical duties do not always give rise to legal obligations.166  
Although the AMA (as well as PhRMA) has promulgated guidelines, 
such guidelines do not (except perhaps in California with regard to the 
PhRMA guidelines)167 carry with them explicit legal obligations.  
However, those guidelines can establish what a physician is expected to 
do.  This, in turn, can establish the foundation for what behavior is 
required of a physician under the common law doctrine of trusts.168  
More active application of this legal obligation will alleviate many of the 
problems associated with pharmaceutical marketing. 
A. What Is a Fiduciary Relationship? 
A hallmark of fiduciary law is its flexibility to accommodate new 
situations as they arise.169  Originally, fiduciary doctrine was the courts’ 
response “to the absence of a remedy . . . for beneficiaries injured by the 
disloyalty of [their] trustees.”170  Over time, this doctrine has been 
extended beyond the trustee-beneficiary relationship to other 
relationships in which a party (the fiduciary) is entrusted with the 
responsibility to act and make decisions on behalf of another individual 
(the beneficiary), with the expectation that the fiduciary will seek to 
promote the beneficiary’s welfare.171  Fiduciary relationships have been 
                                                          
 166. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPALS OF 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT (2002) (“The Preamble and General Principles are 
aspirational goals to guide psychologists toward the highest ideals of psychology.  Although the 
Preamble and General Principles are not themselves enforceable rules, they should be considered by 
psychologists in arriving at an ethical course of action.”). 
 167. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 168. This Article explores the fiduciary duty of physicians arising from the doctrine of trusts.  It 
is also possible to envision the fiduciary duty of physicians, discussed in this Article, to stem from 
the principles of quasi-contract, fraud, or tort, including the doctrine of informed consent.  It should 
be noted, as discussed infra note 182, that the breach of a fiduciary duty is viewed today by the 
courts as largely sounding in tort.  Nevertheless, the roots of this cause of action are deeply 
imbedded in the common law doctrine of trusts and the following discussion in this subsection 
proceeds from this foundation.  For a further discussion of these roots and their impact on this cause 
of action, see Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 64, and Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina 
Spinos, A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Emergent Medical Risk, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming June 2009).  However, space constraints prevent an exploration here of these potential 
alternative foundations for physicians’ fiduciary duty to their patients. 
 169. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A 
Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 239 (1994). 
 170. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1147–48 
(2006). 
 171. Id. at 1147. 
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found to exist between partners of a company,172 directors and 
companies,173 attorneys and clients,174 agents and principals,175 
stockbrokers and clients,176 and, directly relevant to this discussion, 
physicians and patients.177 
Fiduciary rules are designed to ensure that the fiduciary fulfills his or 
her obligations and does not neglect, abuse, exploit, or otherwise take 
advantage of the relatively vulnerable and dependent beneficiary.178  This 
enables the beneficiary to receive needed assistance from the fiduciary, 
albeit with a general expectation that the fiduciary will be compensated 
for his or her services.  Because a more formal relationship would 
involve relatively high transaction and monitoring costs,179 the 
relationship itself tends to be informal; however, the nature of the 
obligations imposed on the fiduciary are derived from a recognition that 
the dependent and vulnerable beneficiary must be able to trust and rely 
upon the fiduciary. 
Generally, the fiduciary owes a duty of utmost loyalty to the 
beneficiary, which entitles the beneficiary to place complete trust in the 
                                                          
 172. See, e.g., Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983); Wash. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holle, 573 
A.2d 1269, 1285 (D.C. 1990); Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ill. 1983); Barksdale v. Lincoln 
Builders, Inc., 764 So. 2d 223, 230 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 
(Mass. 1995); Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
 173. See, e.g., FDIC v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Arizona law); 
Henash v. Ipalook, 985 P.2d 442, 445 (Alaska 1999); Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1262 (Cal. 
2003); Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121 (Conn. 1997); Mynatt v. Collis, 57 P.3d 513, 526 
(Kan. 2002); Hill v. Se. Floor Covering Co., 596 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1992). 
 174. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. 2001); In re Ryan, 670 A.2d 375, 379 
(D.C. 1996); Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879, 
882 (N.Y. 1997); Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Iowa 1996); STAR Ctrs. v. Faegre & 
Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2002); In re Bernstein, 774 A.2d 309, 312 (D.C. 2001). 
 175. See, e.g., Sim v. Edenborn, 242 U.S. 131, 135–36 (1916); Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 
137 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Maine law); Evvtex Co. v. Hartley Cooper Assocs., 102 
F.3d 1327, 1332 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying New York law); Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 
807 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 176. See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 744 F. Supp. 1145, 1156 (S.D. 
Fla. 1990); Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P.2d 658, 660–61 (Ariz. 1966) (holding that an agency 
relationship normally terminates with execution of the order); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Weeks, 304 
S.E.2d 420, 422 (Ga. App. 1983). 
 177. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.10 
(M.D. Pa. 1981); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965); 
Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984); Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978); 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972); Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954); Berkey v. 
Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Simmons v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps. and Clinics, 
642 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ill. 1994); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 960–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1986); Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co., 566 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Woolley 
v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 (Me. 1980). 
 178. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1147–48. 
 179. Id. 
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fiduciary.180  This obligation flows from (1) “the discretionary control 
that [the fiduciary] usually has over a significant aspect of the 
[beneficiary’s] life or assets,” and (2) the discrepancy between the 
interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiary, which may in some 
circumstances directly conflict.181 
B. Establishing a Claim for Breach of a Fiduciary Duty182 
As in negligence actions where a plaintiff must establish duty, 
breach, causation, and harm to prevail, plaintiffs pursuing a fiduciary 
cause of action need to prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship, 
that the defendant breached his or her fiduciary obligations, and, in some 
states, that there is damage proximately caused by the breach.183  
However, at that point, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that he 
or she, in fact, acted as any other fiduciary could have reasonably been 
                                                          
 180. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “fiduciary duty”).  Components of 
this duty are that the fiduciary speak with candor and respect the confidences of the beneficiary.  Id. 
 181. Anderson & Steele, supra note 169, at 240 (citing Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985)). 
 182. Both in theory, and in practice, the breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a tort.  The Second 
Restatement of Torts reads, “[a] fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty 
of tortious conduct to the person for whom he should act.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
874, cmt. b (1979) (“Violation of Fiduciary Duty”).  A number of courts have so held, or stated this 
in dicta.  See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gaudet, 192 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1999); FDIC v. 
Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 266–67 (5th Cir. 1998); Walter v. Drayson, No. CV 06-00568 SOM-KSC, 
2007 WL 2694399, at *4 (D. Haw. Sept. 12, 2007); Filson v. Radio Adver. Mktg. Plan, LLC, 553 F. 
Supp. 2d 1074, 1086 (D. Minn. 2008); Harmelin v. Man Fin. Inc., No. 06-1944, 2007 WL 2739579, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2007); Barber v. Fox, 632 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); 
Tennen v. Hyman, No. 268173, 2007 WL 1828603, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2007); Doe v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 857 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Zuba v. 
Pawtucket Credit Union, 941 A.2d 167, 173 (R.I. 2008) (dictum); Turner v. PV Int’l Corp., 765 
S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. App. 1988).  Some courts have determined that claims of breach of a 
fiduciary duty may sound in contract.  See, e.g., Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992); see 
also Anderson & Steele, supra note 169, at 260 n.165.  But this may be the result of an 
understandable confusion.  Fiduciary relationships usually begin with either an express or implied 
contractual agreement that establishes, for example, employment, brokerage authority, or the 
provision of legal, financial, or medical services.  But “[c]ontract law generally assumes that parties 
bargain at arms length, whether or not the parties actually share equal bargaining leverage, and that 
the resulting bargain governs their relationship.”  Anderson & Steele, supra note 169, at 241.  
Fiduciary relationships, in contrast, are not conducted at arm’s length.  Id. at 242.  As a result, for 
fiduciary relationships, “the law jettisons the general presumptions and standards of the law of 
contract and applies instead the stricter fiduciary standard.”  Id. at 242 (citing Deborah A. DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 896 (1988)).  
Although express terms of an underlying agreement may still be relevant when determining the 
fiduciary’s obligation, the agreement does not control as it would under contract law.  Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Cramer v. Devon Group, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 176, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); City of 
Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring damage); 
Jonas v. Jonas, 633 S.E.2d 544, 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring damage). 
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expected to act under similar circumstances.184  Further, unlike 
negligence actions, fiduciaries cannot cite the beneficiary’s contributory 
or comparative negligence as a defense to a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim.185 
1. Duty 
The plaintiff must first prove that a fiduciary relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant existed at the time of the alleged breach.186  
This establishes that the defendant, as a fiduciary, had a duty to fulfill his 
or her fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary.  The specific duties of the 
fiduciary will vary depending on the nature of the relationship and the 
particular circumstances involved; for example, a trustee, the director of 
a corporation, a guardian, an attorney, and a physician will each have 
somewhat different responsibilities to fulfill to satisfy their obligations as 
a fiduciary.187 
However, the general obligations are relatively similar as fiduciary 
law expects fiduciaries to meet a basic standard of conduct.188  The 
fiduciary must exercise undivided loyalty to the interests of the 
beneficiary and “is required in all matters to further the best interests of 
and to exhibit and to practice fairness and honesty toward the 
[beneficiary].”189  It has been described by one court as a duty of 
“uberrima fides” or a “‘most abundant good faith,’ requiring absolute 
and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any 
concealment or deception.”190 
Fiduciaries must act to protect and enhance the best interests of the 
beneficiary and cannot use their position to promote their own interests 
at the expense of the beneficiary.  They are held to the highest level of 
loyalty and good faith, are prohibited from putting themselves in 
positions where their interests and the beneficiary’s interests conflict, and 
                                                          
 184. Cf. Anderson & Steele, supra note 169, at 253 (1994) (“Although the client retains the 
ordinary burdens of pleading and proof regarding causation and damages, the attorney has the full 
burden of proving that [he] has not violated [his] fiduciary obligation—that [he] has dealt fairly with 
[his] client and that [his] actions were not only acceptable but were above reproach.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 185. Id. at 254 (citing Koral Indus. v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 802 S.W.2d 650, 651 
(Tex. 1990); Isenhower v. Bell, 365 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1963)). 
 186. E.g., Cramer, 774 F. Supp. at 184. 
 187. Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1151–52 (1999). 
 188. Id. at 1152. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
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must, in any direct dealing with the beneficiary (or the legal 
representative of the beneficiary if the beneficiary lacks decision-making 
capacity), make full disclosure of all facts relevant to the fiduciary 
relationship and give the latter an opportunity to obtain independent 
advice.191 
2. Breach 
Violating these fiduciary obligations constitutes a breach of fiduciary 
duty.  “Once the patient provides evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty, 
the burden typically shifts to the physician to disprove the allegation.”192  
Because the beneficiary is not in a position to fully establish either the 
actions of the fiduciary, the circumstances that existed at the time, or 
whether any conflict of interests compromised the judgment or actions of 
the fiduciary, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to show that he or she, in 
fact, acted as a fiduciary could reasonably be expected to act under the 
circumstances.193  The breach of one’s fiduciary duties can be found to 
exist irrespective of a lack of moral culpability on the part of the  
 
                                                          
 191. See, e.g., Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Mass. 1995) (“Partners owe each other 
a fiduciary duty of the highest degree of good faith and fair dealing.”); Hill v. Se. Floor Covering 
Co., 596 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1992) (holding that the general manager of flooring company owed 
a “duty to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty”); In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. 
2001) (holding that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client and must serve the client’s 
interests with the utmost loyalty and devotion); Salm v. Feldstein, 799 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (stating that “[a]s the managing member of the company and as a comember with 
the plaintiff, the defendant owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty to make full disclosure of all material 
facts”); Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App. 2001) (“Breach of fiduciary duty by an 
attorney most often involves the attorney’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest, failure to deliver 
funds belonging to the client, placing personal interests over the client’s interests, improper use of 
client confidences, taking advantage of the client’s trust, engaging in self-dealing, and making 
misrepresentation.”); In re DeSousa, 826 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that 
“[the attorney] engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice as a lawyer by 
breaching his fiduciary duty by failing to advise [his client] to seek advice of independent counsel 
and aiding her in the preparation of documents which bestowed a financial interest upon the 
[attorney]”). 
 192. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1148 (citing Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 655 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1973), rev’d, 520 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1974) (“In a fiduciary relationship, the burden is on the 
defendant to show scrupulous good faith in obtaining an express written authority to operate or to 
extend the operation when it conflicts with the unequivocal beliefs of the patient.”)); see also Smith 
v. Tele-Commc’n, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 571, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 
635 A.2d 798, 810 (Conn. 1994); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); 
Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 754 (Kan. 1983); Gaynier v. Ginsberg, 715 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tex. 
App. 1986); Wilkins v. Lasater, 733 P.2d 221, 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 193. Cf. Anderson & Steele, supra note 169, at 253 (“[T]he attorney has the full burden of 
proving that [he] has not violated [his] fiduciary obligation—that [he] has dealt fairly with [his] 
client and that [his] actions were not only acceptable but were above reproach.” (citations omitted)). 
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fiduciary because of the dependence and vulnerability of the beneficiary 
and the level of trust imbued in the fiduciary.194 
3. Causation and Harm 
As alluded to previously, many states do not have either a causation 
requirement or an actual harm requirement associated with their 
fiduciary causes of action.195  This is in part because (1) the breach of 
loyalty is the harm and (2) the purpose behind recognizing breach of 
fiduciary duty claims is to remove the incentive for disloyal conduct on 
the part of the fiduciary by confiscating the profits gained by fiduciaries 
as a result of their conduct, not necessarily to restore beneficiaries to 
their position ex ante by compensating their losses.196  If, however, actual 
harm and causation can (or must) be shown, the plaintiff may become 
eligible for additional remedies as discussed below. 
4. Remedies 
Because in many fiduciary causes of action there is no, or minimal, 
actual harm, damages often focus on any unjust enrichment gained by the 
fiduciary from the breach.197  The monetary value of this enrichment 
should be returned to the beneficiary.198  This award is designed to 
directly address the fiduciary’s breach of the obligation of loyalty that 
the fiduciary owes to the beneficiary. 
But if the beneficiary experiences actual harm, damages may be 
awarded to compensate the beneficiary for actual loss or injury suffered 
                                                          
 194. Duncan, supra note 187, at 1154. 
 195. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.5:108 (2d ed. Supp. 1987) 
(explaining that, in a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the breach of loyalty is the harm and the client 
is not required to prove causation or specific injury); Duncan, supra note 187, at 1154–55; see also 
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 543 (2d. ed. Rev. 1993) (“Trustee’s Duties In 
General”); Milbank v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994); Zackiva Commc’ns Corp. v. 
Horowitz, 826 F. Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 
1969); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982). 
 196. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 195, § 1.5:108; Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency 
Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2802 (2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d 722, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Sack v. 
Feinman, 413 A.2d 1059, 1065–66 (Pa. 1980) (holding that breaches of fiduciary duty are 
remediable by returning to the complainant the benefit taken by the offending party); Robertson v. 
ADJ P’ship, Ltd., 204 S.W.3d 484, 494 (Tex. App. 2006) (noting that “disgorgement of profits has 
long been recognized as an appropriate remedy for . . . breach of fiduciary duty”). 
 198. See, e.g., Williams, 977 So. 2d at 730; Sack, 413 A.2d at 1065–66. 
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as a result of the fiduciary’s breach of duty.199  When awarded, these 
damages are intended to put the beneficiary in the same position that he 
or she would have been in had the breach not taken place.200  Special 
damages can be assigned to compensate the claimant for quantifiable 
monetary losses suffered by the beneficiary, while general damages may 
be awarded to compensate the beneficiary for the non-monetary aspects 
of the specific harm suffered.201  General damages are usually awarded 
only when beneficiaries have suffered personal harm (e.g., personal 
injury or defamation).202  Finally, punitive damages may also be 
available if there was malice on the part of the fiduciary.203 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims in the Context of Trust Law and Its 
Application to the Patient-Physician Relationship 
Fiduciary relationships are commonly established with the creation 
and management of a trust.  A closer exploration of this particular 
fiduciary relationship will both illuminate the traditional claim of breach 
of fiduciary duty and provide guidance for delineating the fiduciary duty 
of a physician with regard to pharmaceutical marketing. 
Traditionally, a trust is an arrangement in which money or property 
is managed by an entity (the trustee, who is one person, a group of 
people, or an organization) at the request of someone else (the settlor) for 
the benefit of another (the beneficiary).204  The property is owned by the 
trustee but held and managed on behalf of the beneficiary.  Trusts are 
most frequently used when “outright gifts [to the beneficiary] would not 
effectuate the donor’s true intent” (e.g., gifts to individuals who lack the 
                                                          
 199. See, e.g., APC Filtration, Inc. v. Becker, No. 07-CV-1462, 2008 WL 3008032, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 4, 2008) (“Under Illinois law, an employer is entitled to lost profits and compensatory 
damages resulting from an employee’s breach of fiduciary duty.”); Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, 
P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Defendants . . . must allege facts from which 
proximate cause and injury may be inferred if they seek compensatory damages . . . .”). 
 200. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 180, at 416–19 (defining “damages”). 
 201. Id. at 417, 419. 
 202. Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Kan. 1978); Campbell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 203. Daniel J. Pope & Suzanne Lee, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Punitive Damages, 66 DEF. 
COUN. J. 257, 264–65 (1999) (citing Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., 861 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1988)); 
Bank Saderat Iran v. Telegen Corp., No. C-94-2330-VRW, 1997 WL 685247 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 
1997); In re Legal Econometrics Inc., 191 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d in part & vacated 
in part sub nom. Vaughn v. Akin, No. 3-95-CV-0457-R, 1997 WL 560617 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 
1997); Home Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 493 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Fairfax Sav., F.S.B. v. 
Weinberg & Green, 685 A.2d 1189 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989)). 
 204. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 180, at 1546 (defining “trust”). 
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independence, maturity, or financial skills needed to manage the property 
effectively).205 
A trustee’s fiduciary duty has been described as inherent in the trust 
relationship.  Sometimes called the rule of undivided loyalty—or simply 
the loyalty rule—it has been stated as follows: 
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of the trust to administer the 
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.  The trustee must exclude 
all self-interest, as well as the interest of a third party, in his 
administration of the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiary.  The 
trustee must not place himself in a position where his own interests or 
that of another enters into conflict, or may possibly conflict, with the 
interest of the trust or its beneficiary.  Put another way, the trustee may 
not enter into a transaction or take or continue in a position in which his 
personal interest or the interest of a third party is or becomes adverse to 
the interest of the beneficiary.206 
Even though the trustee is the legal owner of the property in the trust, 
enabling the trustee to manage the property as needed, the trustee is 
obligated to suppress his or her own interests and take those steps that 
best serve the interests of the beneficiary.  In this way, the beneficiary 
obtains value from the property without being its technical owner. 
The fiduciary duty doctrine was applied to trustees to control three 
aspects of the typical trustee-beneficiary relationship: the disparity of 
knowledge between the trustee and the beneficiary, the trustee’s ability 
to act relatively unilaterally, and the vulnerability and dependence of the 
beneficiary on the trustee.207  These three traits are also routinely present 
in the physician-patient relationship.  First, the physician, nearly always, 
has a superior understanding of the medical facts and diagnostic and 
treatment protocols than the patient, resulting in a huge disparity of 
knowledge between the two.208  Second, the patient does not have the 
authority, or the ability, to order diagnostic tests or to prescribe 
pharmaceuticals.  Finally, if the patient’s health is at risk, it is likely that 
the patient is worried or afraid, leaving the patient particularly vulnerable 
and dependent on the physician.209 
                                                          
 205. Gerry W. Beyer, Purposes and Uses of Trusts, (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.professor 
beyer.com/Trusts_Course/Purposes_Uses_of_Trusts.htm. 
 206. BOGERT, supra note 195, § 543. 
 207. See Don J. Manderscheid, First Nations and Self-Government: A Matter of Trust, 22 CAN. 
J. L. SOC’Y 109, 110–11 (2007); see also Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1147–48 (discussing the 
origins of the fiduciary duty and identifying these motivating concerns as well). 
 208. Additionally, physicians do things that are difficult for a patient to monitor (e.g., the 
physician’s review of laboratory results). 
 209. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1139. 
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In light of these parallel concerns, it is not surprising that physicians 
may be ascribed a fiduciary duty with regard to their patients.210  The 
patient-physician relationship has been held to encompass fiduciary 
duties such as confidentiality;211 testifying in judicial proceedings about 
treatment rendered the patient;212 disclosing information to the patient 
such as a potential cause of action against the fiduciary,213 emergent 
medical risks,214 and, more generally, all information relevant to 
treatment;215 and acting in good faith toward the patient.216  For example, 
in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the California 
Supreme Court held that a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
personal interests (either research or economic) unrelated to the patient’s 
health that may affect the physician’s medical judgment.217 
This fiduciary duty of physicians should also encompass an 
obligation to avoid placing themselves in situations where 
pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to compromise their medical 
judgment.  Just as a trustee is required to suppress his or her own 
interests and take those steps that best serve the interests of the 
beneficiary, the physician must eschew all pharmaceutical marketing that 
has the potential to compromise patient care.  As discussed, physicians 
may gain by serving as receptors of marketing (e.g., free lunches and 
reduced conference attendance fees),218 but they do so at the risk of 
                                                          
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, No. 00CR1044, 2002 WL 1880127, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 12, 2002) (stating that “[a] fiduciary duty is implicit in the relationship between physician 
and patient”), rev’d on other grounds, 502 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2007); Branom v. State, 974 P.2d 335, 
342 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (describing the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary one); State 
ex rel. Kitzmiller v. Henning, 437 S.E.2d 452, 454 (W. Va. 1993) (holding “that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between a physician and a patient”).  But see Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So. 2d 544 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (stating that “Alabama caselaw holds that a physician-patient relationship is 
not a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law”). 
 211. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. 2006) (recognizing 
“a fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed by a treating physician to his or her patients not to disclose 
information received in connection with treatment”). 
 212. See, e.g., Stigliano v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1995) (ruling that the 
“relationship between treating physicians and their patients, sometimes described as fiduciary in 
nature, gives rise to a duty to testify in judicial proceedings about treatment rendered to the patient”). 
 213. See, e.g., Fowles v. Lingos, 569 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“[T]he doctor-
patient relationship is a fiduciary one, and there may be some circumstances where there is a duty to 
disclose a cause of action.” (citation omitted)). 
 214. See Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 168. 
 215. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
 216. See, e.g., Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991) (finding 
that “[t]he physician-patient relationship is fiduciary [in nature,] based on trust and confidence[,] and 
obligat[es] the physician to exercise good faith” in fulfilling their obligations). 
 217. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
 218. See supra Parts III–IV. 
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diminishing the quality of patient care they offer.219  As previously 
stated, if the patient’s interests are undercut, the physician’s fiduciary 
obligation to the patient is breached. 
There are, however, aspects of the trustee-beneficiary relationship 
that do not fully match the physician-patient relationship and that 
necessitate a somewhat different approach in applying the fiduciary duty 
doctrine in this context.  First, unlike trustees, physicians do not become 
the “owner” of that for which they are responsible.  In other words, 
physicians never “own” the patient or the patient’s body and they can not 
exercise absolute control over it.  Nonetheless, they potentially wield 
enormous influence over what the patient does and the treatment and 
care the patient receives.  As a result, they have a corresponding duty to 
ensure that the information and directions that patients receive from them 
are not tainted or biased by conflicting interests. 
D. Breach of the Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing 
A physician’s fiduciary duty to avoid pharmaceutical marketing 
should be firmly embraced.  As discussed above, pharmaceutical 
marketing substantially impacts the choices physicians make when 
prescribing medications, potentially creating a conflict of interests and 
compromising their medical judgment.  Physicians should avoid 
pharmaceutical marketing to preserve the trustworthiness of their 
medical decisions and to provide the highest quality of care possible to 
their patients.  Recognizing the existence of this duty, however, does not 
necessitate a ban on the dissemination of information by pharmaceutical 
companies about their products. 
Generally, the fiduciary duty of physicians to avoid pharmaceutical 
marketing ought to be straightforward, without opportunities to evade or 
minimize the duty.  One can state this duty as follows: 
Physicians have a fiduciary duty to avoid pharmaceutical 
marketing when their patients’ interests may be compromised. 
This obligation is consistent with the principles recognized by states that 
have passed legislation dealing with pharmaceutical marketing and 
generally embraced by professional organizations.220  This duty requires 
that physicians refrain from accepting visits from pharmaceutical 
representatives, free lunches, “trinkets,” and travel or other subsidies to 
                                                          
 219. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 220. See supra Part IV. 
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attend conferences or programs from pharmaceutical companies.  By 
extension, it also requires that physicians extricate the pharmaceutical 
companies’ presence (both substantively and financially) at CME 
programs.  Finally, it mandates that physicians who have an active 
patient caseload not directly participate in any marketing activities on 
behalf of a pharmaceutical company that could be viewed by a patient as 
compromising the physician’s medical judgment.  Physicians who accept 
these gifts or who engage in these marketing activities may subject 
themselves to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a patient. 
As is the case for a traditional breach of fiduciary duty claim, a 
plaintiff pursuing such a claim against a physician must initially establish 
that a fiduciary relationship existed between the patient and the physician 
at the time of the purported breach.  However, the plaintiff need only 
make a prima facie case that the physician’s medical judgment was 
compromised with regard to the patient’s care as a result of 
pharmaceutical marketing, which generally can be established by 
showing that the physician was the recipient of gifts from a 
pharmaceutical company or participated in marketing activities that were 
relevant to the medical care delivered by the physician to the patient.  
Once this prima facie case is shown, the physician then bears the burden 
of proving that his or her medical judgment was not compromised by the 
pharmaceutical marketing by showing that he or she acted as a 
reasonable fiduciary (i.e., physician) would have been expected to act 
under similar circumstances.221 
Shifting the burden of proof in this manner and employing an 
objective standard to ascertain the expected behavior of the physician is 
appropriate.  As alluded to above, it would be very difficult for the 
plaintiff to establish what the physician’s state of mind was as a result of 
the physician’s interactions with the pharmaceutical company and 
whether this marketing compromised the physician’s medical judgment.  
Ordinarily, the patient does not have direct access to this information and 
the physician is in a much better position to address these issues.  
Nevertheless, to deter the filing of spurious claims, the plaintiff must 
make a prima facie case showing that the physician was the recipient of 
gifts from a pharmaceutical company or participated in marketing  
 
                                                          
 221. As is the case with regard to many legal questions pertaining to physicians, guidance—
albeit instructive, not determinative—for how a reasonable physician would act under the 
circumstances can be drawn from the standards of professional conduct embraced by and governing 
the behavior of the profession (e.g., the Code of Medical Ethics adopted by the American Medical 
Association). 
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activities that were relevant to the medical care delivered by the 
physician to the patient. 
Unless required within that jurisdiction, the plaintiff does not have to 
prove that the patient experienced actual harm (although a lack of actual 
harm, as discussed below, may result in only a de minimis award for 
damages).  Relatedly, the plaintiff will also not be required to establish a 
causal link between the breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty and 
resulting harm to the patient.222  As discussed in general, this variation 
from traditional tort doctrine is in part because the breach of loyalty is 
the harm and because the purpose behind recognizing a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim in this context is to deter disloyal conduct on the 
part of the physician (i.e., conflicts of interests that may impede 
physicians’ exercise of independent medical judgment), as opposed to 
restoring patients to their position ex ante by compensating for their 
losses. 
In the absence of harm and causation requirements, however, there 
must be some mechanism to control which patients may bring a claim.  
Because a given physician is likely to have many patients, to avoid 
calamitous judgments when there has been no showing of actual harm, 
the physician should be allowed to establish that the gifts the physician 
received or the marketing activities in which the physician participated 
were not relevant to the medical care delivered by the physician to the 
patient.  For example, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty would be 
defeated if a physician was treating a patient for a condition unrelated to 
the marketing involved.223 
After successfully establishing that a breach of fiduciary duty 
occurred, damages should be available.  The focus will often be on 
assessing what benefit was gained by the physician from the breach of 
duty, which in turn could be awarded to the beneficiary.  For example, 
the plaintiff could be entitled to recover the value of the gifts given to the 
physician (although this could be nominal in the case of “trinkets” 
                                                          
 222. As will be discussed, however, if a plaintiff can show that the patient experienced direct 
harm and that the physician’s breach of fiduciary duty was the causal agent of this harm, the 
resulting availability of compensatory damages can result in a larger award.  See infra notes 224–26 
and accompanying text. 
 223. The focus of this fiduciary cause of action is whether a physician has been disloyal to a 
patient by placing him or herself in a position where his or her independent medical judgment may 
have been compromised by a conflict of interest.  If the marketing activity in which the physician 
has been involved is unrelated to the medical care or treatment afforded the patient, there is no basis 
to conclude that the physician’s medical judgment with regard to that patient was compromised.  If, 
for example, a patient is being treated for a heart condition and a physician has accepted free 
samples for the treatment of athlete’s foot, that patient has no basis for concluding that the 
physician’s medical judgment with regard to his or her treatment was influenced. 
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received by the physician).  An alternative route could be for the plaintiff 
to show that the patient chose to obtain services from this physician 
because the physician’s participation in various marketing activities gave 
the physician a reputation as being an “expert” in a given field germane 
to the patient’s medical needs.  The “benefit” obtained wrongfully by the 
physician in this case would be the profits or perhaps even the revenue 
the physician received as a result of providing medical services to the 
patient.  In general, as is typically the case with fiduciaries that have 
breached their duty to a beneficiary, the physician should be required to 
provide an accounting of the “profits” gained. 
The patient may also be eligible for an equitable remedy of 
restitution224 or compensatory damages for economic or non-economic 
harms.225  However, such awards may be difficult to assign when no 
actual damage was shown.  These remedies are intended to make a 
patient “whole,” offering recovery for any physical, financial, or 
emotional injury suffered because of the physician’s failure to avoid 
pharmaceutical marketing.226  But these damages will be especially hard 
to quantify here, if they exist at all. 
In addition, punitive damages may be appropriate in a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.227  Many courts and commentators agree that the 
prevailing patient should be eligible for punitive damages, especially in 
cases of extreme disloyalty when malice was present.228  To prove this 
malice, typically a plaintiff should have to show that the doctor knew 
that harm to the patient would follow from his or her behavior, and yet 
the physician still failed to take steps to avoid pharmaceutical marketing.  
Given the abundance of reports about the negative effects of 
pharmaceutical marketing, this knowledge and intent could potentially be 
inferred to all practicing physicians directly involved in pharmaceutical 
marketing today.  Furthermore, in failing to avoid the potentially 
                                                          
 224. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1148–49; see also Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, 
Managed Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA 
Preemption for State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 44–46 
(2001) (discussing equitable and compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duty). 
 225. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1156–57. 
 226. McLean & Richards, supra note 224, at 44–46. 
 227. Mehlman, supra note 170, at 1149. 
 228. Id. at 1149; see, e.g., Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215, 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that punitive damages are available in breach of fiduciary duty cases); In re Estate of Hoellen, 854 
N.E.2d 774, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that punitive damages can be awarded for intentional 
breach of fiduciary duty without an award of actual damages); Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 
155, 197 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an award of punitive damages may be appropriate on a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty upon a showing of malice); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine 
Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 71 n.245 
(1997) (citing scholarship, cases, and treatises in support of this contention). 
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deleterious effects of pharmaceutical marketing, a physician violates his 
or her professional ethical code as well as the legal duty of a fiduciary, 
making punitive damages potentially more appropriate in a breach of 
fiduciary duty case than in a medical malpractice case, where such 
damages are rarely awarded.229 
E. Retaining the Positive Benefits of Pharmaceutical Marketing 
It can be argued that imposing a fiduciary duty on physicians to 
avoid pharmaceutical marketing may negatively impact patient care in at 
least two ways.230  First, it can be contended that it will curtail 
                                                          
 229. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 243 (5th ed. 
2004) (“Punitive damages are extremely rare.”).  For a discussion of how a failure to adhere to the 
standards of their profession constitutes the foundation for a breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
physicians, see Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 168. 
 230. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there are also at least two First Amendment 
challenges that may be raised regarding the recognition of a physician’s fiduciary duty to avoid 
pharmaceutical marketing.  For one, pharmaceutical companies may assert that it infringes their right 
to engage in commercial speech.  The First Amendment protects advertising as a form of 
commercial speech.  As summarized by the Supreme Court: 
The commercial market place, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a 
forum where ideas and information flourish.  Some of the ideas and information are vital, 
some of slight worth.  But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the 
government, assess the value of the information presented.  Thus, even a communication 
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the 
First Amendment. 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).  The pharmaceutical companies may argue that 
directing physicians to avoid pharmaceutical marketing will eviscerate their ability to promote their 
products and constitute an unconstitutional infringement of their right to engage in commercial 
speech. 
The constitutional protections for commercial speech, however, are weaker than for private 
speech.  While the Supreme Court has often acknowledged constitutional protection for commercial 
speech, the Court has recognized the “‘common sense’ distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and 
other varieties of speech.”  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (citing Va. 
Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)).  This 
distinction has led the Court to conclude that “[t]he Constitution . . . affords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”  United States v. Edge 
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (citations omitted).  The established four-part test for assessing 
governmental restrictions on commercial speech is: 
[First, the commercial speech] at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If 
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest. 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  A pivotal 
question would be whether recognizing this fiduciary duty promotes a governmental interest and is 
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.  In addition, it is worth noting that the 
imposition of a fiduciary duty on physicians to avoid pharmaceutical marketing does not restrict 
pharmaceutical marketers from continuing to speak by promoting their drugs through other 
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pharmaceutical support for medical research.  Second, it may be asserted 
that it will eliminate the availability of free samples of medications for 
patients who are otherwise unable to afford these medications. 
For example, without clinical trials, new and needed medications 
cannot obtain the required approval from the FDA.231  Pharmaceutical 
companies rely heavily on practicing physicians recruiting their patients 
to participate in these trials.232  If the fiduciary duty of physicians 
precludes them from conducting these trials, it may be more difficult for 
pharmaceutical companies to conduct the necessary widespread studies, 
which could impede valuable medications from receiving FDA approval.  
Plus, these clinical studies—in which patients are typically not required 
to pay for the medications they are receiving—may make treatment 
unavailable to patients who could not otherwise afford it. 
Similarly, as discussed earlier, physicians often accept samples of 
medications from pharmaceutical companies ostensibly to pass them 
along to patients who are unable to afford the retail price of the medicine 
or who would find it difficult to travel to a pharmacy in a timely fashion 
to obtain a needed medication.233  As also noted, this does not always 
happen in practice because these medications are often given to patients 
who can afford and readily obtain them, or they are diverted to other 
                                                                                                                       
marketing channels.  However, the pharmaceutical industry may respond that this fiduciary duty 
removes its primary audience, leaving its speech nearly pointless.  Although this issue cannot be 
resolved within the confines of this Article, it is worth noting that one of the recommendations 
described below, namely the establishment of a neutral third party as a vehicle for disseminating 
pharmaceutical samples and related information, provides a means for this industry to continue to 
engage in commercial speech that reaches physicians.  In addition, as also discussed below in the 
text, indirect or inadvertent contacts with the pharmaceutical industry, particularly when there are no 
gifts or compensation directed to the physician involved, do not constitute a breach of the 
physician’s fiduciary duty and thus does not preclude this industry from engaging in various other 
forms of commercial speech (e.g., advertising in medical journals) in an attempt to bring information 
about their products to the attention of physicians. 
Finally, it should be recognized that physicians may raise First Amendment claims; namely that 
their right to hear speech or their right to associate with the pharmaceutical marketers is being 
infringed by this fiduciary duty.  Although to the authors’ knowledge no such claim has been raised 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) in response to medical codes of ethics or various state and federal 
efforts that seek to limit pharmaceutical marketing—suggesting that there is not a lot of support for 
such claims—it is still a potential challenge that could be applied to a recognition of a physician’s 
fiduciary duty to avoid pharmaceutical marketing.  Beyond recognizing that neutral third parties 
could be used to disseminate pharmaceutical samples and related information to physicians, thus 
ensuring that physicians could hear the speech and maintain links with pharmaceutical companies, 
this too is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 231. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008). 
 232. Christian D’Avignon-Aubut, Certifying the Validity and Integrity of Reports on Clinical 
Studies Submitted to the FDA: A New Role for a New Breed of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
499, 502 (2007). 
 233. See Interview with Barbara Allison-Bryan, supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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purposes.234  In addition, most of the time, the samples are brought into 
the medical office or hospital by detailers235 and were not requested by a 
physician.236 
However, as discussed, both of these practices have the potential to 
insidiously compromise the independent medical judgment of the 
physician and jeopardize the physician’s duty of undivided loyalty to a 
patient.237  Better alternatives are available. 
For example, instead of having samples being made available on a 
selective basis by detailers, pharmaceutical companies that wish to 
distribute free samples of their products to raise awareness of them and 
encourage their use could be required to give these samples, as well as 
information about these products, to a neutral third party that does not 
provide direct medical care to patients.238  This third party would collect 
these samples from the various pharmaceutical companies and make the 
samples and information about these products (although not necessarily 
the marketing information provided by the pharmaceutical company) 
available to physicians who request them.  On a regular basis, the third 
party would distribute a list of the drugs it has in stock and information 
about the drugs it has compiled.  Physicians, upon the routine receipt of 
this list, could then request those medicines that they want for their 
office.  The medicine would be delivered free of charge to the physician 
and would be available for in-office distribution to patients.  In this way, 
physicians would have a range of products from which to choose, would 
not be subject to marketing information that may be presented to favor 
                                                          
 234. See Westfall et al., supra note 82, at 142 and accompanying text; Tong & Lien, supra note 
83, at 1363–64 and accompanying text; see also Cutrona et al., Characteristics, supra note 83, at 
287 (“[L]ess than one third of all [free drug] sample recipients were low income and less than one 
fifth . . . were uninsured at any point during the year.”). 
 235. Fisher, supra note 13, at 210. 
 236. Interview with Barbara Allison-Bryan, M.D. (Mar. 23, 2008).  This is an effort to capitalize 
on the availability heuristic.  Detailers will, upon the written request of the physician, provide 
specified product samples from their company as well.  Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 
295, 309 (1994). 
 237. See supra Part III. 
 238. This neutral third party could be a governmental agency, a non-governmental organization 
that may be established or funded by the government, or perhaps an established community clinic 
that already makes medications directly available to patients in need (although their distribution 
activities would need to be kept separate from any clinical services they provide).  See also Rubin, 
supra note 82 (“By April 1, [2009,] none of the [University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s] 530 
practice sites will accept samples from drug reps.  Instead, doctors can turn to the e-Sample Center, a 
‘virtual sample closet’ . . . .  [University of Pittsburgh] doctors can [then] order samples online from 
participating makers, who ship them for free.”); Lewis, supra note 159 (noting that the Wisconsin 
Medical Society recently required its members to “instead use a system of vouchers for evidence-
based drug choices”).  
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the product being marketed, and would be able to work with a neutral 
third party who can provide existing and emerging information about the 
products, as well as collect information about concerns that may be 
raised regarding a given distributed product. 
Presumably, this will significantly diminish the effects of the 
availability heuristic and enhance the physician’s exercise of independent 
medical judgment.  Before ordering a medication from the third-party 
supplier, the physician will have to make a conscious choice as to which 
samples to order and consider the likely merits of the medication.  The 
physician can then make a thoughtful choice about whether giving a 
patient this particular product is in that patient’s best interest.  It also 
allows physicians to learn about new pharmaceuticals and other products 
on the market and permits healthy competition between established and 
emerging products.239 
Similarly, the recognition of the fiduciary duty of physicians to avoid 
pharmaceutical marketing may necessitate revamping the way in which 
clinical research is conducted.  Other commentators have expressed 
concern about pharmaceutical companies’ involvement in clinical 
research in general and have called for change.240  As for pharmaceutical 
samples, it may be appropriate and timely to involve neutral third parties.  
Medical practitioners, particularly those who are also trying to juggle a 
full patient case load, may not be the most appropriate individuals to 
gather the requisite information regarding the effects of the medications 
being studied.  In addition, concerns have been raised about the 
reliability and neutrality of clinical studies conducted by pharmaceutical 
companies when their very existence may depend on the outcome of the 
study.241  A neutral third party, possibly the same entity responsible for 
                                                          
 239. There are some potential drawbacks to this approach.  For example, by inserting a third 
party into these transactions, the cost of providing samples to patients may increase.  Someone must 
pay for the services provided by these third parties.  Pharmaceutical companies may be willing to 
fund these services, particularly if they conclude that this is the best way of bringing their product to 
the attention of physicians.  In light of the large amounts they are spending on marketing, they may 
actually determine that this is a more cost-effective means of disseminating information about their 
products and welcome this alternative.  Alternatively, funding might be provided by the government 
or by private donors if they conclude that this is a needed public service that will enhance the quality 
of health care in this country. 
 240. See, e.g., Joel R. Lexchin, Implications of Pharmaceutical Funding on Clinical Research, 
39 ANNALS PSYCHOTHERAPY 194, 195 (2005); Chopra, supra note 37, at 114; Is the University-
Industrial Complex Out of Control?, 409 NATURE 119, 119 (2001); Jacob Goldstein, Nobel Laureate 
Calls for Public Funding of Drug Trials, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
health/2008/12/16/nobel-laureate-calls-for-public-funding-of-drug-trials/ (citing Arjun Jayadev & 
Joseph Stiglitz, Two Ideas to Increase Innovation and Reduce Pharmaceutical Costs and Prices, 28 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 165 (2009)). 
 241. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Featured 
Report, Influence of Funding Source on Outcome, Validity, and Reliability of Pharmaceutical 
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distributing pharmaceutical samples and related information, may be an 
appropriate alternative that can enhance confidence in these studies and 
avoid creating conflicts of interest for treating physicians.  Physicians 
seeking to obtain free treatment for their patients can instead refer their 
patients to these third parties who also control the distribution of pooled 
funds originating from pharmaceutical companies designated for clinical 
research. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the fiduciary duty of physicians to 
avoid pharmaceutical marketing does not reach indirect or inadvertent 
contacts with the pharmaceutical industry, particularly when there are no 
gifts or compensation directed to the physician involved.  There remains 
a need for physicians to be informed about new medications or emerging 
applications of older medications that may prove beneficial to their 
patients.  Certainly, merely reading articles in medical journals that 
receive support from a pharmaceutical company regarding research that 
was funded by a pharmaceutical company does not violate a physician’s 
duty to avoid pharmaceutical marketing.  Similarly, physicians should 
not face sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty for simply opening and 
reading mail or flyers sent to them by a pharmaceutical company 
promoting their programs.  Such contacts are not sufficiently insidious to 
constitute a conflict of interest and to compromise the physician’s 
independent medical judgment.  Indeed, the dissemination of this 
information may be vital in providing physicians with information about 
both the benefits and risks of the medications they are employing or may 
employ. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Pharmaceutical marketing currently pervades the practice of 
medicine.  Unfortunately, in some forms it can have potentially severe 
and adverse consequences for the quality of patient care.  Despite the fact 
that professional organizations such as the AMA and many states have 
adopted or passed ethical guidelines and statutes, respectively, 
admonishing or prohibiting physicians from accepting gifts or 
compensation from agents of pharmaceutical companies seeking to 
market their products, the practice has not stopped. 
                                                                                                                       
Research (A-04) (2004), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14314.html; see 
also David B. Resnik, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest to Research Subjects: An Ethical and Legal 
Analysis, 11 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 141, 144 (2004) (“There is considerable evidence of a 
connection between the source of research funding and the outcomes of biomedical research 
studies.” (citation omitted)). 
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This Article has proposed recognizing the physicians’ fiduciary duty 
to their patients as a means to more fully deter physicians from accepting 
these gifts and thereby ensure that the well-being of their patients 
remains their focus.  It will also reassure patients that they can trust and 
rely on the undivided loyalty of their physicians. 
As part of their fiduciary duty to their patients, physicians have a 
legal obligation to avoid placing themselves in situations where 
pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to compromise their medical 
judgment.  While this fiduciary duty does not reach indirect or 
inadvertent contacts with the pharmaceutical industry, particularly when 
there are no gifts or compensation directed to the physician involved, 
physicians who violate their fiduciary obligation, even if it does not 
directly harm a patient, may face a claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
brought by or on behalf of their patient.  Although compensatory 
damages may be awarded if warranted, the availability of punitive 
damages in this context serves as a further incentive for physicians to 
comply with this duty.  Two carefully circumscribed exceptions to this 
duty, one for clinical research sponsored by pharmaceutical companies 
and another for the creation of a third-party distribution system for 
pharmaceutical samples, will preserve many of the positive benefits of 
marketing.  By recognizing this fiduciary duty, physicians will be 
encouraged to abstain from inappropriate exposure to pharmaceutical 
marketing and thereby return the practice of medicine to what should be 
its patient-centered focus. 
 
